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Abstract
This paper explores how extended unemployment insurance (UI) benefits targeted to older
workers affect early retirement and social welfare. The trade-off of optimal UI between consump-
tion smoothing and moral hazard requires accounting for the entire early retirement system,
which often includes extended UI and relaxed access to disability insurance (DI). We argue that
extended UI generates program complementarity (increased take-up of UI followed by DI and/or
regular retirement benefits) and program substitution (increased take-up of UI instead of DI).
Exploiting Austria’s regional extended benefit program, which extended regular UI benefits to
up to 4 years, we find: (i) program complementarity is quantitatively important for workers
aged 50+; and (ii) program substitution is quantitatively relevant for workers aged 55+. We
derive a simple rule for optimal UI that accounts for program complementarity and program
substitution. Using the sufficient statistics approach, we conclude that UI for older workers was
too generous and the regional extended benefit program was a suboptimal policy.
Keywords: Early retirement, unemployment, disability, policy reform, optimal benefits
JEL Codes: J14; J26; J65.
∗Address: Lukas Inderbitzin, University of St. Gallen, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland; email
lukas.inderbitzin@unisg.ch. Stefan Staubli, RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA 22202, United States;
email sstaubli@rand.org. Josef Zweimu¨ller, University of Zurich, CH-8000 Zurich, Switzerland; email
josef.zweimueller@econ.uzh.ch.
We thank Christoph Basten, Monika Bu¨tler, Raj Chetty, Peter Egger, Armin Falk, Andreas Kuhn, David A. Jaeger,
Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Rafael Lalive, Lucija Muehlenbachs, Kathleen Mullen, Gerard van den Berg, and seminar
participants at CREST, IFAU, IZA, NHH Bergen, RAND, University of Bonn, University of Copenhagen, University
of Cologne, University of St. Gallen, Stockholm School of Economics, University of Zurich, the 7th Norwegian-German
Seminar on Public Economics, and the 2011 EALE meeting for helpful comments. Philippe Ruh provided excellent re-
search assistance. Staubli and Zweimu¨ller acknowledge funding from the Austrian National Science Research Network
“Labor and Welfare State” of the Austrian FWF and the National Institute on Aging (R21AG037891). Inderbitzin
acknowledges funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation (PBSGP1-141949). All remaining errors are our
own.
1 Introduction
Extending the potential duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits is one of the most
important policy instruments to ease economic hardships of job losers. For instance, the United
States extended UI benefits from 26 weeks to up to 99 weeks during the Great Recession. Many UI
systems let UI generosity not only vary over the business cycle but also across groups with different
labor market conditions. In particular, many countries grant more generous UI benefits to older job
losers. The present paper studies the impact of extended UI benefits on employment and retirement
behavior of older workers and explores the welfare implications of increased UI generosity for the
elderly.
The social desirability of UI benefit extensions is highly controversial. Theoretical arguments
show that optimal UI faces a trade-off between moral hazard effects, captured by labor supply/job
search responses, and consumption smoothing benefits, captured by relaxed liquidity constraints
(Baily (1978), Chetty (2008)).1 In the context of older workers, this general logic needs to be
broadened by considering the costs and benefits of all welfare benefits that protect older workers
in case of a job loss. In many countries, early retirement schemes allow older unemployed workers
to withdraw from the work force by using extended UI benefits in combination with other public
transfers (DI benefits and/or retirement benefits). This is what we call program complementarity.
Alternatively, more generous UI benefits may induce workers to reduce take-up of other welfare
programs, in particular DI benefits. This is what we mean by program substitution. While program
complementarity imposes an additional burden on government budgets, the impact of program
substitution is unclear.2
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we study the causal impact of extended UI
benefits on (i) the incidence of early retirement and (ii) the particular pathways through which
workers exit the labor market. We focus on Austria where we can study how extended UI benefits
interact with take-up of DI benefits and retirement benefits. Under the Austrian system of the late
1980s and early 1990s, workers aged 50+ were eligible for 1 year of regular UI benefits. Moreover,
worker aged 55+ had relaxed access to DI benefits. To empirically identify the causal impact of
extended UI benefits for older workers we exploit a policy intervention that changed early retirement
incentives dramatically: the regional extended benefits program (REBP). This program was in place
between June 1988 and July 1993 and granted regular UI benefits for up to 4 years to workers aged
50+ living in certain regions of the country. Variation in the maximum duration of UI benefits
across regions and age groups allows us to identify the causal impact of extended UI benefits on the
1While several empirical papers have documented both the consumption smoothing benefits of UI benefits (Gruber
(1997), Browning and Crossley (2001)), a large literature documents the adverse consequences of more generous
benefits for unemployment exit rates (see, e.g., Meyer, 1990, Katz and Meyer (1990), and Card and Levine (2000)).
2When DI take-up is associated with stigma costs or a disutility due to medical checks/bureaucratic hassles, a
worker may decide to stay unemployed even when UI benefits are smaller than DI benefits. This saves money to the
government. In contrast, DI benefits often provide a constant stream of income while alternative early retirement
pathways imply varying income levels over time. Liquidity constrained workers may thus prefer DI benefits even if
lifetime income is lower. Program substitution is associated with higher government expenditures when the latter
effect dominates.
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incidence of early retirement and the particular pathways by which workers leave the labor market.
Our estimation strategy is a difference-in-differences approach. Since the REBP was only in effect
for a limited period of time we can test whether the effects of introducing and abolishing extended
UI benefits are symmetric.
We find that the REBP had a strong effect on the incidence of early retirement. The probability
that a job loser aged 50-54 permanently withdraws from the labor market increases by 17 percentage
points when the worker is eligible to the REBP. Among job losers aged 55-57, the incidence of
early retirement increases by 10.8 percentage for those eligible to the REBP.3 The program also
affected the pathways into early retirement. For workers aged 50-54, program complementarity
– increased take-up of UI followed by higher DI benefit claims and/or retirement benefits – is
quantitatively important. The 17 percentage point increase in early retirement is associated with
a 12.6 percentage point increase in a subsequent DI take-up. For workers aged 55-57 not only
program complementarity but also program substitution – higher take-up of UI but lower take-up
of DI – are at work. The 10.8 percentage point increase in early retirement is associated with a
23.1 percentage point increase in subsequently claiming of retirement benefits and a 12.7 percentage
reduction in claiming of DI benefits.
The second aim of this paper is to explore the welfare consequences of early retirement rules.
We follow the sufficient statistics approach proposed by Chetty (2006a) and set up a simple model
that makes precise the impact of more generous UI benefits on labor supply and retirement.4 The
model establishes a simple rule for optimal UI that accounts for both program complementarity and
program substitution. We find that, given the Austrian early retirement rules of the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the extension of UI benefits was welfare-improving only if the degree of risk aversion
exceeds 2.07. The value of risk aversion remains disputed and a growing body of literature suggests
that risk preferences are context-specific (Chetty and Szeidl (2007), Barseghyan et al. (2011), Einav
et al. (2012)). Studies that use labor supply elasticities to estimate risk aversion come closest to our
setting. These studies typically find values of risk aversion below 1 (Chetty, 2006b). We therefore
conclude that extended UI through the REBP was most likely a suboptimal policy.
We think our study is of general interest for two reasons. First, policy makers in many coun-
tries have implemented early retirement schemes and these schemes are both very costly and very
controversial. In many countries, reforms reducing the generosity of these schemes are debated or
under way. In this context, Austria is an interesting case study because early retirement schemes
were heavily used to mitigate labor market problems of older workers over the past decades. As
a result, Austria’s effective retirement age has fallen below age 59, well below the OECD aver-
age.5 Second, while the Austrian early retirement system created particularly large incentives, it
3As we explain in more detail in the next section, retirement incentives are different before and after age 55 due
to relaxed access to DI benefits. Moreover retirement incentives between REBP- and non-REBP regions disappear
after age 57. This is why our analysis looks at age groups 50-54 and 55-57.
4Recent applications of the sufficient statistic approach for optimal UI design include Shimer and Werning (2007),
Chetty (2008), Kroft (2008), Landais et al. (2010), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011), Schmieder et al. (2012), and Landais
(2012). See the article by Chetty and Finkelstein (2012) for a detailed discussion of this literature.
5According to OECD (2006), in 2004 the average effective retirement age among males ranged from 58 years in
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works qualitatively similar than in many other countries. Early retirement schemes often feature
relaxed DI-eligibility criteria for older workers, including the United States (Chen and van der
Klaauw, 2008), and extended UI benefit durations are extended above certain age thresholds, as
in Germany, (Schmieder et al., 2012).6 This suggests that our results speak to mechanisms (policy
changes) that are at work (debated or implemented) in many early retirement systems.
Our paper is related to a growing literature that studies how multiple social insurance programs
affect workers’ labor supply decisions and differs from the larger literature that studies the isolated
effect of a single program on labor supply and/or early retirement. Autor and Duggan (2003)
examine the interaction between unemployment and disability insurance in the United States. They
find that less strict medical screening, declining demand for less skilled workers, and an increase in
the earnings replacement rate are the most plausible candidates to explain the rise in DI take-up.
Using administrative data from the Netherlands, Borghans et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence
that reducing the generosity of DI benefits increases enrollment into other forms of social insurance.
Petrongolo (2009) studies the impact of the UK JSA reform of 1996 that imposed stricter job search
requirements and additional administrative hurdles for UI benefit claimants. It turns out that the
fall in UI benefit recipients was associated with higher take-up of DI benefits. Furthermore, rather
than increasing the transition to regular jobs, the reform temporarily decreased the outflow to
employment.7
A recent literature studies the impact of UI and/or DI on labor supply and retirement of
older workers.8 Karlstro¨m et al. (2008) find that stricter eligibility criteria for DI benefits in
Sweden increased take-up of unemployment and sickness benefits, but did not increase employment
rates. In contrast, Kyyra¨ (2010) provide evidence that increasing age-thresholds for UI benefits
and tightening medical criteria for DI eligibility in Finland raised the effective retirement age by
almost 4 months. The results of Staubli (2011) suggest that increasing the minimum age of relaxed
DI access in Austria lead to a significant decline in DI enrollment but only a slight increase in
employment. Kyyra¨ and Ollikainen (2008) document a strong increase in early retirement after a
reform in Finland that increased the eligibility age for extended UI benefits from 53 to 55. Lammers
et al. (2013) show that increased search requirements for older unemployed in the Netherlands
increased not only employment rates but also DI take-up. Our paper extends this literature by
investigating how extended UI benefits for older workers affect retirement behavior through program
complementarity and program substitution; and by using the estimated behavioral elasticities to
Hungary to 74 years in Mexico. The effective retirement ages in US, UK, Switzerland, Germany and France were 63,
62, 66, 61, and 59.
6Countries other than Austria and the United States that relax access to DI for older workers include Australia,
Denmark, Finland (until 2003), and Sweden (until 1997). Countries other than Austria and Germany that extend
UI above certain age thresholds include France, Finland, Greece, Italy, and Portugal.
7Spillover effects among social insurance programs have been examined in other contexts by Garrett and Glied
(2000), Schmidt and Sevak (2004), Bound et al. (2004), Duggan et al. (2007), Roelofs and van Vuuren (2011), and
Staubli and Zweimu¨ller (2012).
8Related to these studies is the work on the extension of UI benefits for older workers by Winter-Ebmer (2003),
Kyyra¨ and Wilke (2007), Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004a, 2004b) and Lalive (2008). These papers analyze the UI
program in isolation and ignore potential interactions with other social insurance programs.
3
explore the welfare implications of extended UI benefits for older unemployed workers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the institutional background
of Austria. In particular, we discuss the various pathways to early retirement that the Austrian
welfare state offers to older workers and the rules associated with the regional extended benefit
program. In Section 3 we describe our data and provide some preliminary descriptive evidence of
the impact of the REBP. Section 4 lays out our identification strategy. In Section 5 we discuss our
main results. In Section 6 we develop a theoretical early retirement framework which allows us
to address the welfare consequences of extending the unemployment benefits duration. Section 7
summarizes our main results and draws some policy conclusions.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Austria’s Public Pension System
There are three types of government-provided benefits in Austria that are important for the
labor market withdrawal of older unemployed: old-age pensions, disability pensions, and unem-
ployment benefits. Disability and old-age pensions provide the main source of retirement income
and replace on average 80% of the last net wage up to a maximum of approximately 2,900 eu-
ros per month. Both pensions are subject to income taxation and mandatory health insurance
contributions.
Under the rules in place during the 1990s, an old-age pension can be claimed at any age after
60 for men and 55 for women, conditional on having 35 contribution years or 37.5 insurance years.
Insurance years comprise both contributing years (periods of employment, including sickness, and
maternity leave) and qualifying years (periods of unemployment, military service, or secondary
education). Eligibility criteria are relaxed for individuals who have been unemployed for at least
12 months in the past 15 months. They only need 15 contribution years to qualify for an old-age
pension at the early retirement age of 60 for men and 55 for women.
In Austria disability pensions play an important role for early retirement, because access to
a disability pension is relaxed at age 55.9 In particular, below that age threshold applicants
are generally eligible for benefits if a medically determinable impairment reduces the capacity
to work by at least 50 percent in any occupation in the economy. Applicants above age 55 are
classified as disabled if their capacity to work is reduced by more than 50% in the same occupation.
As a consequence of this relaxation in eligibility criteria, disability enrollment raises significantly
beginning at age 55. Because men first become eligible for old-age pensions at age 60 as opposed
to 55 for women, labor market withdrawal through the disability insurance is particularly common
among older men.
The unemployment insurance system plays an important role in the labor market exit of older
9In 1996, the age limit for relaxed access to disability pensions was raised to age 57, for an evaluation of this
policy change, see Staubli (2011). All individuals that are considered in the empirical analysis below, were subject
to pre-1996 disability pension rules.
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workers not only because older unemployed enjoy relaxed access to an old-age pension but also
because they are eligible for extended unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits are not
taxed and replace around 55% of the last net wage, subject to a minimum and maximum (though
only a small fraction of individuals are at the maximum). Regular unemployment benefits can
be claimed for a limited period based on previous work history. Individuals who have worked 1
year or more in the last 2 years receive benefits for 20 weeks, while those with at least 3 years of
employment in the past 5 years receive benefits for 30 weeks. Job losers aged 50 and older who
have paid unemployment insurance contributions for 9 years or more in the last 15 years can claim
unemployment benefits for 52 week.10 Job losers who exhaust the regular unemployment benefits
can apply for unemployment assistance. These means-tested transfers last for an indefinite period
and can be at most 92% of regular unemployment benefits.11
In addition, unemployed men aged 59 or older and unemployed women aged 54 or older can claim
special income support, provided that they had contributed to the unemployment insurance for at
least 15 out of the previous 25 years. Special income support is equivalent to an unemployment
spell in legal terms, but with 25% higher benefits. Benefits are paid for a period of 12 months
to bridge the gap until individuals become eligible for an old-age pension. The rules are more
generous for workers in the mining sector who can claim special income support for up to 5 years
starting at age 55 for men and age 50 for women. Special income support can be combined with
regular unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance. Thus, eligible unemployed can claim
unemployment benefits up to age 54 for women and age 59 for men followed by special income
support.
2.2 Heterogeneity in Replacement Rates
The amount of an old-age pension is determined by the “assessment basis” and the “pension
coefficient”. The assessment basis corresponds to the average earnings of the best 15 years after
applying an earnings cap in each year. The pension coefficient corresponds to the percentage of
the assessment basis that is replaced by the old-age pension. The pension coefficient increases with
the number of insurance years up to a maximum of 80%. Disability pensions are calculated in the
same way as old-age pensions, except for a special increment that is granted to claimants below
age 55. Postponing a disability or old-age pension claim by one year increases the replacement
rate by roughly 2 percentage points. Regular unemployment benefits are a function of annual
earnings one or two years before unemployment entry (depending on the starting month of the
unemployment spell), subject to a minimum and a maximum. The gross replacement rate declines
with previous earnings from a maximum of around 60% for low-income earners to approximately
40% for high-income earners. On top of regular unemployment benefits, family allowances are paid.
10Before August 1989, the potential unemployment duration was 30 for all individuals above age 50. See Lalive
et al. (2006) for a detailed description of the policy change and its impact on the unemployment duration of job
losers.
11In 1990, the median unemployment assistance benefits were about 70% of the median unemployment benefits
(Lalive, 2008).
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Notice that unemployment benefits depend only on earnings in the previous job, while disability
and old-age pensions are based on the entire work history. Thus, an individual’s replacement rate of
a disability or an old-age pension can be very different from the replacement rate of unemployment
benefits. For example, an unemployed whose earnings prior to job loss are high compared to his or
her life-time earnings will have relatively high unemployment benefits but a relatively low disability
or old-age pension, and vice versa. As a consequence of the heterogeneity in replacement rates
across individuals for the same social insurance program, job losers who are similar in observable
characteristics may have very different incentives to retire early via a particular program. This
aspect will be of central importance in our empirical analysis and the theoretical model described
below.
To illustrate the heterogeneity in replacement rates across individuals, we split our sample of
job losers (described in more detail in Section 3 below) into quartiles according to their UI and DI
net replacement rates. As Table 1 illustrates, there is a large dispersion of UI and DI replacement
rates among older unemployed. For example, the median replacement rate for 50-54 year old job
losers in the bottom quartile of the UI replacement rate distribution is roughly constant at 55%
but the median DI replacement rate varies between 54.5% (column 1) and 96.0% (column 4). Table
1 also shows that the number of unemployment entrants in each cell is large, suggesting that the
correlation between previous earnings and life-time earnings is not very strong.
Table 1: Heterogeneity in UI and DI replacement rates
DI repl. rate age 50-54 DI repl. rate age 55-57
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile
UI repl. rate
1st quartile
No. of Obs. 3,767 3,897 3,021 1,481 1,227 1,306 1,410 719
Median DI repl. rate 54.5 66.6 75.1 96.0 55.4 67.0 75.7 86.9
Median UI repl. rate 54.9 53.1 53.8 54.8 54.4 52.9 52.0 54.6
2nd quartile
No. of Obs. 4,225 3,371 3,022 1,549 1,579 1,427 1,026 630
Median DI repl. rate 54.7 66.2 75.9 89.4 55.5 66.5 75.5 86.3
Median UI repl. rate 58.0 58.4 59.3 59.8 57.8 58.1 58.3 58.6
3rd quartile
No. of Obs. 2,121 3,011 3,662 3,372 883 1,119 1,342 1,318
Median DI repl. rate 54.6 66.8 76.0 92.9 55.5 67.3 76.0 89.6
Median UI repl. rate 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.3 61.0 61.0 60.9 60.7
4th quartile
No. of Obs. 2,054 1,887 2,462 5,764 973 810 884 1,995
Median DI repl. rate 53.5 66.8 76.4 105.2 53.3 67.0 76.0 97.5
Median UI repl. rate 63.0 62.0 61.9 62.3 61.9 61.8 61.7 61.9
Notes: All replacement rates are after taxes. Sample includes unemployment spells starting in January 1985 to
December 1995 (except spells starting between January 1988 and June 1988) by men in the age group 50-57. See
Section 3.1 for details on the construction of the sample.
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2.3 The Regional Extended Benefit Program and Retirement Pathways
To preclude Soviet appropriation after World War II, Austria nationalized its iron, steel, and oil
industries, and related heavy industries. After the mid-1970, the state-run company O¨sterreichische
Industrie AG, in charge of administrating the nationalized firms, faced shrinking markets due to
the international oil and steel crisis, low productivity, and outdated smokestack industries. At
the beginning the resulting financial losses were covered by governmental subsidies, but in 1986 a
speculation scandal in the steel industry triggered the abolishment of the protectionist policy. A
new management was appointed that implemented a strict restructuring plan. This process caused
layoffs and downsizing of production plants, particularly in the steel industry.
To protect older workers against adverse labor market conditions in the steel industry, the
Austrian government enacted the Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP) in June 1988. The
program extended the potential unemployment duration from 52 weeks to 209 weeks for a subgroup
of workers. To become eligible for the benefit extension an unemployed worker had to satisfy each of
the following criteria at the beginning of the unemployment spell: (i) age 50 or older, (ii) continuous
work history (15 years of employment in the past 25 years), (iii) location of residence in one of
the eligible regions for at least 6 months prior to unemployment entry, and (iv) start of a new
unemployment spell after June 1988 or spell in progress in June 1988.
Control regions (CRs)
Treated regions 1 (TR1s)
Treated regions 2 (TR2s)
Figure 1: Regional distribution of REBP
The REBP was initially implemented in 28 of about 100 labor market districts. The minister
for social affairs, a member of the ruling social democratic party (SPO¨), was in charge of selecting
the regions that were included in the program. While the records of the meetings in which the set
of regions eligible to the program was decided upon is not open to the public, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller
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(2004b) show that eligible regions were characterized by a relatively high share of employment in
the steel sector (around 17% in REBP regions versus roughly 5% in non-REBP regions).12 However,
there were no differences between treated and non-treated regions in terms of the unemployment
rate or the fraction of long-term unemployed. In December 1991 a reform took place that became
effective in January 1992. The reform abolished the benefit extension in six of the originally 28
regions. The 1991 reform also tightened eligibility criteria, as individuals had to be not only
residents, but also previously employed in a REBP region. We label the set of treated regions that
were excluded after the reform as “TR1s”. In the remaining 22 regions the REBP was in effect
until August 1993 when it was abolished entirely. We label the regions that kept eligibility after the
reform as “TR2s”. The regions that were never entitled to the REBP are labeled as “CRs”. Figure
1 plots the distribution of REBP across the 2,361 communities in Austria. The Figure illustrates
that treated regions (communities with black or dark-gray shading) are all located on a contiguous
area in the Eastern and Central parts of Austria.
The introduction of the REBP dramatically changes the incentives for early retirement for older
unemployed, as shown in Figure 2. Prior to the REBP older job losers could withdraw from the
labor force at age 58 and bridge the gap until the eligibility age for an old-age pension by claiming
unemployment benefits for 12 months followed by special income support for 12 months. With the
introduction of the REBP eligible unemployed can effectively withdraw through the unemployment
insurance system at age 55. Thus, we expect that during the program is in effect there will be an
increase in the fraction of 55-57 year old unemployed who use the REBP as a bridge to an old-age
pension. This is an example of a program complementarity effect: the more generous UI benefits
increase the sequential take-up of multiple programs.
Age
Old-Age Pension
Special Income Support
Relaxed Disability Pension
with REBP
with REBP
50 51 54 55 58 59 60
Figure 2: Early retirement pathways with/without REBP-eligibility
Job losers above age 55 also have the option to retire early via disability insurance, since
eligibility criteria for a disability pension are significantly relaxed after age 55. It is very likely that
some 55-57 year old unemployed who would have claimed a DI pension under the regular duration of
UI benefits of one year may use the REBP to retire early via the unemployment insurance. This is
12The ultimate decision on set of regions that became eligible to the program was heavily criticized by opposition
parties and media as being biased towards the clientele of the ruling parties.
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an example of a program substitution effect: the more generous UI benefits reduce contemporaneous
take-up of another program.
Figure 2 shows that the REBP also leads to important changes in the early retirement incentives
for job losers below age 55. More specifically, prior to the REBP job losers below age 55 could
withdraw from the labor market at age 54 by claiming unemployment benefits for 12 months
followed by a disability pension at age 55. With the introduction of the REBP this option is
already available to job losers who are age 51 and older. Thus, we expect that the REBP leads to
a program complementarity effect among job losers below age 55, because some unemployed who
would have returned to employment under the less generous rules use the REBP as a bridge to a
disability pension.
3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
3.1 Data
To examine how extended UI benefits for older workers affect the incidence of and the pathway
into early retirement, we combine register data from two different sources. The Austrian Social
Security Database (ASSD) provides very detailed longitudinal information on the entire labor
market and earnings history of all private-sector workers in Austria (Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009). The
second source is the Austrian unemployment register, which contains information on the place of
residence (community) and relevant socio-economic characteristics.
Our main sample consists of all male job losers who are between age 50-57 at the beginning of
their unemployment spell and who enter unemployment from a job in the non-steel sector between
1/1985 and 12/1987 and between 6/1988 and 12/1995. These spells are followed up until end of
2006. We focus on men because women are already eligible for an old age pension at age 55 (as
opposed to age 60 for men), which is also the age for relaxed access to a disability pension. Hence,
our empirical design is useful to understand program complementarity and substitution for males
but it is less appropriate in the case of females. We exclude unemployment spells starting between
1/1988 and 5/1988 because ongoing spells were also eligible for the REBP. Excluding these spells
guarantees that the before-period is not strongly affected by the REBP. We exclude job losers
from the steel sector because older steel workers in treated workers may face worse labor market
prospects due to the steel crisis. In our observation period 196,364 unemployment spells were
started by men in the age group 50-57. From these, we drop 41,130 unemployed men with less than
15 employment years in the past 25 years. Only job seekers who satisfy this criterion are eligible
for the REBP.13 Because the Austrian labor market is characterized by large seasonal employment
fluctuations (Del Bono and Weber, 2008), we also exclude 87,920 men who were recalled by their
previous employers to eliminate job seekers on temporary layoffs who are not searching for a job.
The final sample thus comprises 67,314 unemployment spells.
13This contribution requirement also guarantees that job seekers in our sample will be eligible for special income
support at age 59 and for an old-age pension at age 60.
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Table 2: Sample statistics in treated (TRs) and control regions (CRs) before, during, and after
REBP
Before REBP During REBP After REBP
CRs TRs CRs TRs CRs TRs
Exit destinations (%)
Early retirement 33.7 41.5 44.1 75.4 47.9 56.8
Disability pension 22.4 29.7 30.2 45.7 33.0 42.1
Old-age pension 9.8 9.8 11.5 26.6 11.7 11.4
Censored 1.5 2.0 2.4 3.2 3.2 3.3
Background characteristics
Age at UI entry 53.5 53.4 53.3 53.6 53.5 53.5
Sick days 113 117 112 93 97 101
Married 0.752 0.777 0.753 0.807 0.759 0.770
Education
Low 0.575 0.621 0.495 0.485 0.429 0.455
Medium 0.356 0.336 0.404 0.436 0.443 0.444
High 0.070 0.043 0.101 0.079 0.128 0.101
Daily wage 56.6 54.5 63.7 69.4 68.9 68.2
Blue collar 0.802 0.837 0.726 0.745 0.664 0.719
Experience (years) 11.3 11.3 11.1 11.8 11.2 11.2
Tenure (years) 3.1 3.1 3.6 5.1 4.1 4.3
No. of Obs. 10,677 2,578 24,287 9,049 16,669 4,054
Notes: “Before” denotes unemployment spells starting in January 1985 to December 1987. “During” denotes unem-
ployment spells starting in June 1988 to July 1993 (December 1991 in TR1s). “After” denotes unemployment spells
starting in August 1993 (January 1992 in TR1s) to December 1995. “Sick days” is the sum of days spent in sick
leave prior to unemployment entry, “experience” denotes work experience in the last 13 years, and “tenure” refers to
tenure in last job. Daily wage is adjusted for inflation.
Table 2 presents summary statistics on job losers entering unemployment before (1/1985–
12/1987), during (6/1988–7/1993), and after the REBP (7/1993–12/1995) by region of residence.
A comparison of exit destinations before, during, and after the REBP illustrates the impact of
the program on early retirement behavior of unemployed men. More specifically, before the REBP
the probability to retire early is 7.8 percentage points higher in treated regions (41.5%) relative to
control regions (33.7%) because job losers in treated regions are more likely to exit unemployment
by claiming a disability pension. Here early retirement comprises exits to disability pensions and
old-age pensions (including special income support) as well as censored spells. The difference in
the probability to retire early increases to 31.3 percentage points during the REBP. The increase
in the incidence of early retirement during the REBP is driven by more unemployed men claiming
disability and old-age pensions. After the abolishment of the program, the difference in the inci-
dence of early retirement between treated and non-treated regions decreases again to the pre-REBP
level. Note also the upward trend in the incidence of early retirement and disability over the whole
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period, suggesting that labor market conditions over the observation period deteriorated in treated
and non-treated regions.
A comparison of background characteristics shows that job losers in treated regions are more
likely to work in blue-collar occupations and tend to be less educated than job losers in control
regions. These differences partially explain the higher probability to claim a disability pension
in the treated regions before and after the REBP. Table 2 also illustrates that during the REBP
the unemployment inflow increases in treated regions relative to control regions. More specifically,
the ratio of unemployment spells in treated regions versus non-treated regions is roughly 1 to 4
before the REBP. This ratio increases to approximately 1 to 2.5 during the REBP. Winter-Ebmer
(2003) finds that this increase occurs because firms used the REBP to get rid of high-tenured and
expensive older workers. This finding is consistent with the statistics in Table 2, given that during
the REBP job losers in treated regions earn higher wages and have more tenure compared to job
losers in non-treated regions.
3.2 Descriptive Evidence
To graphically assess the impact of extended UI benefits on the incidence of and pathway into
early retirement, Figures 3-5 plot the fraction of transitions from unemployment into different exit
states by age of UI entry and region of residence before, during, and after the REBP.
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Figure 3: Transitions into early retirement by age in treated (TRs) and control regions (CRs)
before, during, and after REBP
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
Figure 3 illustrates that the REBP had a strong effect on the incidence of early retirement
among eligible unemployed. More specifically, there is a drastic increase in transitions into early
retirement at ages 50-57 in treated regions during the program was in effect. The regional difference
in transitions into early retirement during the REBP amounts to almost 30 percentage points for
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the age group 50-55 and is somewhat smaller for the age group 56-57. For the age group 58-59
there are only small regional differences during the REBP because unemployed men in this age
group can rely on regular unemployment benefits and special income support to retire early. Also
for the age group 45-49 there are almost no regional differences in transitions into early retirement,
as these individuals are not eligible for the REBP.
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Figure 4: Transitions into disability pensions by age in treated (TRs) and control regions (CRs)
before, during, and after REBP
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
Figure 4 shows the corresponding picture for transitions from unemployment into disability
pensions. The middle panel of Figure 4 illustrates that the higher incidence of early retirement
for the age group 50-54 is driven by an increase in transitions into disability pensions. For this
age group the transition rate into disability pensions is around 20 percentage points higher in
treated regions compared to control regions during the REBP is in effect. Thus, the increased
duration of unemployment benefits during the REBP strengthens the sequential take-up of multiple
programs (program complementarity). For the age group 55-57 there is clear evidence for both a
program substitution and a program complementarity effect. More specifically, there is a decline in
transitions into disability pensions during the REBP in treated regions relative to control regions
(program substitution) and, as illustrated in Figure 5, a significant increase in transitions into
old-age pensions (program complementarity).
Figures 3 and 4 also show that transitions into early retirement and disability pensions tend to
be slightly higher in treated regions after age 50 before the implementation of the program and after
its abolishment. These differences are likely to reflect underlying differences in the structure of the
workforce between treated and non-treated regions. For example, Table 2 shows that job losers in
treated regions work more often in blue-collar occupations and are less educated on average. Both
factors are likely to increase the risk of experiencing a career ending disability.
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Figure 5: Transitions into old-age pensions by age in treated (TRs) and control regions (CRs)
before, during, and after REBP
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
Figure 6 illustrates how transitions into early retirement, disability pensions, and old-age pen-
sion for the age groups 50-54 and 55-57 develop over time in treated and non-treated regions.
For both age groups there are only small regional differences in transition rates into different exit
states before the REBP started. In the second half of 1988, the period when the program started,
transitions rates start to diverge. For the age group 50-54 transition rates into early retirement,
disability pensions, and (to a smaller extent) old-age pensions increase in REBP-regions relative to
non-REBP regions. For the age group 55-57, there is a decline in transitions into disability pensions
and a disproportionate increase in transitions into old-age pensions so that overall transitions into
early retirement increase. After the second half of 1993, when the program was abolished, the
effects of the REBP are reversed and regional differences in transition rates are relatively small
again.
In sum, these figures provide evidence that the REBP increased the incidence of early retirement
among eligible unemployed. For the age group 50-54 the increase in early retirement is driven by
a program complementarity effect: there is an increase in transitions into disability pensions and
old-age pensions during the REBP. For the age group 55-57 there is both a program substitution
and a program complementarity effect: there is a decline in transitions into disability pensions and
an increase in transitions into old-age pensions during the program is in effect.
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Figure 6: Trends in transitions into early retirement, disability pensions, and old-age pensions in
treated (TRs) and control regions (CRs) by year and age group
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
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4 Identification Strategy
To estimate the causal effect of extended UI benefits on early retirement, we exploit the quasi-
experimental variation in the duration of UI benefits across Austrian regions generated by the
REBP. Our identification strategy relies on a difference-in-differences (DD) approach. The first
difference is over time, since the program was in effect only from June 1988 to July 1993. The
second difference is across geographic areas; only older job seekers living in one of the 28 selected
regions were eligible for the benefit extension. Because the REBP was only in effect for a limited
period of time, we are able to test whether the policy effects of introducing and abolishing extended
UI benefits are symmetric.
A third difference would be age because only unemployed aged 50 or older were eligible for
the REBP. However, as Figures 3-5 illustrated, few unemployed workers below age 50 enter early
retirement by claiming a disability pension or an old-age pension. A comparison between job losers
below and above age 50 would therefore not be very informative to identify the effect of extended
UI benefits on transitions from unemployment into early retirement.
The difference-in-differences comparison is implemented by estimating regressions of the follow-
ing type:
yit = α+ βTR1i + γTR2i + δDt + ηAt + pi(Dt × TRi) + µ(At × TRi) + λt +X ′itθ + εit, (1)
where i denotes individual and t is the start date of the unemployment spell. The outcome variable
yit is a dummy, which is equal to 1 if an individual leaves unemployment into the exit state of
interest and 0 otherwise. We distinguish between three different types of exits: early retirement,
disability pension, and old-age pension. The variables TR1 and TR2 are dummy variables that
indicate whether or not an individual lives in treated region 1 or treated region 2 to control for
region-specific differences; TR is an indicator taking the value 1 if an individual lives in a treated
region; D is an indicator taking the value 1 if the unemployment spell started after the REBP was
in effect (June 1988); and A is an indicator taking the value 1 if the unemployment spell started
after the REBP was abolished (January 1992 in TR1s and August 1993 in TR2s). We include year
effects (λt) to control for macroeconomic conditions and a set of background characteristics (Xit)
to control for observable differences that might confound the analysis (age fixed effects, marital
status, blue-collar status, education, work experience, years of service, sick leave history, last wage,
previous industry, and quarter of inflow). To account for the possibility that observations may not
be independent within labor market regions, standard errors are clustered within the labor market
regions of the Austrian unemployment insurance administration. There are roughly 150 of these
regions.
The coefficients of interest in equation (1) are pi and µ which measure the effect of the REBP
on older job losers in treated regions relative to control regions in the years when the program was
in effect relative to before its implementation (pi) and in the years after which the program was
abolished relative to during the program (µ). Clearly, if the introduction and abolishment of the
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REBP have symmetric effects on the outcome variable of interest we have pi = −µ.
Equation (1) is estimated separately for the age groups 50-54 and 55-57 because the impact of
the REBP on early retirement behavior is likely to be very different for both groups. In particular,
job losers in the age group 50-54 may use the REBP to bridge the gap until age 55 when conditions
for disability classification are relaxed. Job losers in the age group 55-57 can directly apply for a
disability pension under the relaxed eligibility criteria, but may use the REBP instead to bridge
the gap until age 60 when they become eligible for an old-age pension.
To explore the impact of the policy reform for each age separately, we generalize this identifi-
cation strategy to an interaction term analysis:
yit = α+
57∑
j=50
βj(dij × TR1i) +
57∑
j=50
γj(dij × TR2i) +
57∑
j=50
δj(dij ×Dt) +
57∑
j=50
ηj(dij ×At)
+
57∑
j=50
pij(dij ×Dt × TRi) +
57∑
j=50
µj(dij ×At × TRi) + λt +X ′itθ + εit, (2)
where dij is a dummy that indicates whether individual i is age j at the start date of the unem-
ployment spell. Each coefficient pij and µj captures all variation in the outcome variable specific to
individuals of age j in treated regions (relative to control regions) when the program was in effect
(pij) and after the program was abolished (µj), using variation in the duration of unemployment
benefits over time.
The central identifying assumption is that trends in the outcome variable in non-treated regions
are informative on the counterfactual in the absence of the REBP. This assumption means that there
are no omitted time-varying and region-specific effects correlated with the program. There are some
doubts on the validity of this assumption, given that the motivation behind the implementation of
this policy was to provide a better protection to older unemployed who were previously employed in
the steel sector. It therefore seems plausible that the steel crisis caused worse labor market prospects
for older steel workers in treated regions during the REBP was in effect. Such an idiosyncratic shock
to steel workers in treated regions would violate the identifying assumption. For this reason we
limit our sample to job losers who were not previously employed in the steel sector. However,
excluding steel workers may still yield biased results if there are spillover effects from the steel
sector to non-steel sectors. We run several robustness checks to test for this possibility.
First, the availability of data from several years pre- and post-REBP allow us to examine the
importance of spillovers from the steel sector affecting the entire region. In particular, labor market
trends in treated and control regions should move in parallel in the absence of negative spillover
effects from the steel sector. The graphical analysis from the previous section suggests that labor
market trends in treated and non-treated regions are similar given that there are no substantial
differences in transition rates from unemployment into other states prior to the inception of the
REBP and after its abolishment. To examine the existence of differential trends across regions in
more detail, equation (1) is generalized by replacing (Dt × TRi) and (At × TRi) with a full set of
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treatment times half-year interaction terms:
yit = α+ βTR1i + γTR2i + δDt + ηAt +
1995h2∑
j=1985h1
pij(djt × TRi) + λt +X ′itθ + εit, (3)
where djt is a dummy that equals 1 if the unemployment spell (t) starts in half-year j and 0
otherwise and λt denotes half-year fixed effects. Here, we set TR equal to 0 in TR1s after the
reform of the REBP in December 1991. Each coefficient pit can be interpreted as an estimate of the
impact of the policy change in a given half-year on the treatment group relative to the comparison
group. The interaction terms provide tests for anticipatory behavior and differential trends. The
coefficients pij should be zero prior to 1988 and after the first half of 1993, if the REBP was an
exogenous and unanticipated policy.
As a second robustness test to examine the presence of region-specific labor market shocks we
restrict attention in the estimation to unemployed who live no farther than 30 minutes car drive
from the border between treated and control regions. The idea is that job losers living close to the
border are likely to operate in the same local labor market. Hence, labor market shocks should
affect treated and non-treated job losers in the same way. However, this approach is potentially
problematic if the REBP affects employment opportunities of job losers living in control regions
close to the border due to reduced competition for jobs. Such spillover effects to non-treated workers
would violate the assumption that trends in control regions are informative on the counterfactual.
To examine whether the REBP had an effect on non-treated job losers we will estimate equation (1)
for job losers in the age groups 45-49 and 58-59. Because these individuals were not eligible for the
REBP (age group 45-49) or did not need the REBP to retire early (age group 58-59), the estimated
coefficients should be zero; any statistical significance would indicate direct spillover effects from
treated to non-treated individuals.
As a third robustness test we will estimate equation (1) for a sample of job losers who previously
worked in the tradable-goods sector with the exception of industries that are directly linked with
the steel sector via the factor market (iron and steel product manufacturing) or via the product
market (ore mining). The idea behind this approach is that labor demand prospects in this sector
are less influenced by local economic conditions. Hence, potential spillovers effects from the steel
sector to non-steel sectors should be less important. Moreover, this approach is less susceptible to
externalities of the REBP on non-treated individuals, because treated and non-treated individuals
are less likely to operate in the same local labor market.
Another threat to the validity of our identification strategy is the possibility that the more
generous unemployment rules lead to selective unemployment inflow. As illustrated in Table 2, the
inflow rate into unemployment rises substantially in treated regions relative to control regions during
the REBP is in effect. Moreover, during the REBP job losers in treated regions have higher earnings
on their last job and more tenure than job losers in control regions. This pattern is consistent with
Winter-Ebmer (2003) who finds that the higher inflow is due to firms using the REBP to get rid
of high-tenured and expensive older workers. Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004a) show that most of the
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excess unemployment inflow in treated regions is concentrated in the periods immediately before
the reform (December 1991) and the abolishment of the REBP (August 1993). We perform two
robustness tests to ascertain that selective inflow does not affect our results. First, we estimate
equation (1) excluding all unemployment spells that started in periods of high unemployment inflow
(after September 1991). In the second robustness test we additionally exclude job losers with high
tenure and high earnings in their last job.
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
The first set of results is summarized in Table 3, with columns 1 through 3 providing the results
from equation (1) for the age group 50-54 and the next three columns displaying the analogous
results for the age group 45-49. The dependent variable is an indicator, which is equal to 1 if an
individual exits unemployment through the state in question and 0 otherwise.
Table 3: Average effect on unemployment exit of age groups 50-54 and 45-49
Age 50-54 Age 45-49
Early Disability Old-age Early Disability Old-age
retirement pension pension retirement pension pension
REBP introduced 0.170*** 0.126*** 0.039* -0.007 -0.008 0.004
(D × TR) (0.022) (0.028) (0.022) (0.012) (0.011) (0.004)
REBP abolished -0.187*** -0.123*** -0.048*** 0.006 0.002 0.003
(A× TR) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003)
During 0.142*** 0.127*** -0.008 0.024** 0.005 -0.022***
(D) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005)
After -0.008 0.005 -0.017* -0.008 -0.004 -0.001
(A) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
Treated regions 1 0.014 0.025 -0.014 -0.009 0.010 -0.010**
(TR1) (0.037) (0.036) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004)
Treated regions 2 0.081*** 0.080*** -0.006 0.003 0.016 -0.008*
(TR2) (0.019) (0.022) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
R2 0.194 0.144 0.084 0.133 0.103 0.011
Mean in TRs pre-REBP 0.336 0.269 0.044 0.079 0.061 0.017
No. of Obs. 48,666 48,666 48,666 63,689 63,689 63,689
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within
labor market regions. Controls: marital status, education, last annual wage, unemployment, blue collar status,
employment history, tenure in last job, previous industry, age, year and quarter of inflow. Significance levels: *** =
1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
The first row shows that the REBP increases the probability of entering early retirement among
50-54 year old job losers in treated regions by 17 percentage points, or 50% of the baseline transition
rate into early retirement in the pre-REBP period. This decline is mostly driven by an increase in
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transitions into disability pensions of 12.6 percentage points (column 2) and - to a lesser extent -
by an increase in transitions into old-age pensions by 3.9 percentage points (column 3). The third
row shows that the effects on transitions from unemployment into different exit states are reversed
after the program is abolished. The effect on transitions into early retirement is somewhat larger
in absolute value, but the difference is statistically not significant.
The next three columns present analogues estimates for the age group 45-49 who were not
eligible for the REBP. The point estimates are always small and insignificant. This finding suggests
that the REBP had no substantial spillover effects to the labor demand for the age group 45-49
via general equilibrium effects and that labor market prospects of job losers in treated regions and
non-treated regions followed similar trends. Table 3 also illustrates that over the period under
consideration there is an upward trend in the incidence of early retirement for the age group 50-54
both in treated and non-treated regions. More specifically, among 50-54 year old job losers there
is 14.2 percentage point increase in the probability to enter early retirement. The rise in early
retirement is due to an increase in transitions into disability pensions. No such increase can be
observed for the age group 45-49. This pattern may indicate a general decline in labor market
conditions for older workers.
Table 4: Exit to disability pensions for age group 50-54
Exit age 50-54 Exit Age 55+
REBP introduced -0.025** 0.151***
(D × TR) (0.011) (0.026)
REBP abolished 0.013 -0.136***
(A× TR) (0.008) (0.023)
During 0.038*** 0.090***
(D) (0.010) (0.013)
After -0.018** 0.023**
(A) (0.009) (0.011)
Treated regions 1 0.013 0.012
(TR1) (0.017) (0.024)
Treated regions 2 0.026** 0.054***
(TR2) (0.013) (0.017)
R2 0.035 0.155
Mean in TRs pre-REBP 0.100 0.169
No. of Obs. 48,666 48,666
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within
labor market regions. Controls: marital status, education, last annual wage, unemployment, blue collar status,
employment history, tenure in last job, previous industry, and quarter of inflow. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** =
5%, * = 10%.
The increased inflow into DI by 50-54 year old unemployed in treated regions should occur
after age 55, because eligibility criteria for a disability pension are very strict before age 55. To
investigate how the REBP affects the claiming age of a disability pension, we estimate two versions
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of equation (1). In the first version the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value 1 if a 50-
54 year old job loser claims a disability pension before age 55. In the second version the dependent
variable is an indicator taking the value 1 if a 50-54 year old job loser claims a disability pension
after age 55. The first column of Table 4 shows that the probability to claim a disability pension
before age 55 declines by 2.5 percentage points during the REBP and increases by 1.3 percentage
points after the REBP. As illustrated in the second column, the REBP has a large impact on the
claiming of a disability pension after age 55. More specifically, the probability to enter DI after age
55 increases by 15.1 percentage points during the REBP and decreases by 13.6 percentage points
after the REBP. These results are consistent with the claim that 50-54 year old job losers use the
REBP to bridge the gap until age 55 when eligibility criteria for a disability pension are relaxed.
Table 5: Average effect on unemployment exit of age groups 55-57 and 58-59
Age 55-57 Age 58-59
Early Disability Old-age Early Disability Old-age
retirement pension pension retirement pension pension
REBP introduced 0.108*** -0.127*** 0.231*** -0.017 0.001 -0.019
(D × TR) (0.029) (0.046) (0.042) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021)
REBP abolished -0.101*** 0.134*** -0.240*** -0.018 0.038* -0.055**
(A× TR) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.013) (0.023) (0.028)
During 0.242*** 0.377*** -0.146*** 0.452*** 0.199*** 0.237***
(D) (0.054) (0.035) (0.048) (0.079) (0.029) (0.074)
After 0.025 0.000 0.020 -0.004 -0.010 0.008
(A) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Treated regions 1 0.071** 0.065 0.009 0.061*** -0.050* 0.112***
(TR1) (0.031) (0.056) (0.052) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034)
Treated regions 2 0.094*** 0.048 0.046 0.045*** -0.001 0.046
(TR2) (0.030) (0.042) (0.039) (0.014) (0.020) (0.028)
R2 0.204 0.079 0.250 0.141 0.087 0.169
Mean in TRs pre-REBP 0.632 0.374 0.249 0.971 0.070 0.893
No. of Obs. 18,648 18,648 18,648 11,501 11,501 11,501
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within
labor market regions. Controls: marital status, education, last annual wage, unemployment, blue collar status,
employment history, tenure in last job, previous industry, age, year and quarter of inflow. Significance levels: *** =
1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
Table 5 presents estimates of equation (1) for the age group 55-57 (columns 1 to 3) and the age
group 58-59 (columns 4 to 6). The first row indicates that the introduction of the REBP led to an
increase in transitions from unemployment to early retirement of 10.8 percentage points among the
treated individuals aged 55-57. There is also clear evidence for a program substitution effect: in the
years the program was in effect older job seekers are significantly less likely to enter the DI program
and more likely to use the REBP as a bridge to an old-age pension. More specifically, during the
REBP there is a decline in transitions into disability pensions of 12.7 percentage points and an
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increase in transitions into old-age pensions of 23.1 percentage points. Similar to unemployed men
in the age group 50-54, there is a clear reversal in the effects on early retirement behavior after the
program was abolished, as shown in the third row. Columns 4 to 6 present analogous estimates
for the age group 58-59. The point estimates are mostly insignificant, which is consistent with the
proposition that for this age group the REBP had no impact on the set of available pathways to
early retirement.
In the estimates presented in Tables 3 to 5, the variables to correct for differences in observable
characteristics between treated and non-treated regions enter in a linear way. However, if the
impact of the policy is heterogeneous with respect to observable characteristics, it is important
to control for relevant observable characteristics in a very flexible way. The linear specification
may not be sufficient to capture the influence of covariates. To allow for more flexibility, we follow
Blundell et al. (2004) and match on two propensity scores to estimate the effects of the introduction
of the REBP. These propensity scores balance the distribution of observable characteristics in the
treated and non-treated regions before and during the REBP. A similar matching method can be
applied to estimate the effects of the abolishment of the REBP. We estimate the propensity score
with a probit model and use radius matching with a radius of 0.02. Estimates of the matching
difference-in-differences approach are reported in Table 6. The first three columns show that for
the age group 50-54 the estimates are very similar as the OLS estimates reported in Table 3. For
the age group 55-57 we find similar effects for the abolishment of the REBP as in Table 5 and a
somewhat larger program substitution effect during the REBP. Overall, these results suggest that
the linear model corrects well for regional differences in observable characteristics.
Table 6: Difference-in-differences matching
Age 50-54 Age 55-57
Early Disability Old-age Early Disability Old-age
retirement pension pension retirement pension pension
REBP introduced 0.165*** 0.128*** 0.031** 0.113*** -0.186*** 0.284***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.013) (0.023) (0.038) (0.038)
REBP abolished -0.166*** -0.102*** -0.044*** -0.112*** 0.115*** -0.233***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021)
Notes: Estimation based on the approach by Blundell et al. (2004). Radius matching with a radius of 0.02. Propensity
score estimated with a probit model. Controls: marital status, education, last annual wage, unemployment, blue
collar status, employment history, tenure in last job, previous industry, age, and quarter of inflow. Significance levels:
*** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
To further explore the impact of the introduction and abolishment of the REBP, Figure 7 plots
the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms from equation (2) for each age j separately. Each
dot on the solid lines is an indicator for living in a treated region and being a given age during the
REBP (black line) and after the REBP (gray line). A 95-percent confidence interval is shown by
dotted lines.
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Figure 7: Coefficients of the interactions (dij × Dt × TRi) and (dij × At × TRi) in equation (2)
for transitions into early retirement, disability pensions, and old-age pensions. The dotted lines
represent 95-percent confidence interval.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
As shown in the first panel, coefficients for entering early retirement are positive for all ages
during the REBP is in effect. The point estimate at age 50 amounts to approximately 10 percentage
points and increases to around 20 percentage points for the ages 51 to 55. The effect is not so
strong for 50 year olds because in addition to the REBP these individuals need to draw one year
of unemployment assistance, which is lower than regular unemployment benefits, to bridge the gap
until the age for relaxed access to a disability pension. The point estimates decline at ages 56
and 57 because these job losers are relatively close to age 59 when they become eligible for special
income support. Hence, many of these job losers permanently retire even without the REBP. As
the gray line illustrates, the impact of extended unemployment benefits on the incidence of early
retirement is reversed after the program is abolished.
The black line in the middle panel shows that for job losers below age 54 in treated regions
there is a significant increase in transitions from unemployment to disability pension of almost 20
percentage points. The point estimate for age 54 is insignificant because 54 year old job losers in
non-treated regions can also bridge the time until age 55 with the regular duration of UI benefits
of one year. With the abolishment of the REBP excess DI entry in the age group 50-53 is reversed,
as shown by the gray line.
For unemployed workers in the age group 55-57, estimated coefficients for entering disability are
negative, providing evidence for a program substitution effect. More specifically, with the intro-
duction of the REBP, the exit channel into an old-age pension became financially more attractive
relative to claiming a disability pension. The estimated decline during the REBP is large and
amounts from 12 to 20 percentage points. Consistent with this view, for unemployed men above
age 55 transitions into old-age pensions increase by almost 30 percentage points during the REBP
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is in effect, as illustrated in the third panel. There is also a significant increase in transitions into
old-age pensions for 54 year old job losers, even though these individuals need to rely on one year of
unemployment assistance to bridge the time until age 60 when they become eligible for an old-age
pension. Finally, the gray line in the third subfigure highlights that after the abolishment of the
REBP the effects on transitions into old-age pensions are reversed for all ages.
5.2 Policy Endogeneity
The key assumption of our identification strategy is that trends in transitions from unemployment
into different exit states would be the same in treated and non-treated regions in the absence of
the REBP. This assumption rules out differential trends that existed already prior to the REBP as
well as idiosyncratic shocks to treated and non-treated regions.
The availability of several years of data before and after the REBP allows us to investigate to
what extent trends differ across regions. More specifically, Figure 8 plots the estimated coefficients
of the interaction terms (equation (3)) for the age groups 50-54 and 55-57 over the full sample
period 1985 to 1995. Each dot on the solid line is the coefficient of the interaction between an
indicator variable for half-year and living in a treated region (a 95-percent confidence interval is
shown by dotted lines). In all six panels the estimated coefficients fluctuate around 0 before the
REBP (June 1988) and after its complete abolishment (July 1993), providing evidence that the
empirical strategy is not simply picking up long-run trends in differences between treated and non-
treated regions. As shown in the top left and bottom left panels, coefficients for early retirement
turn significantly positive during the REBP. For the age group 50-54 the effect increases over time,
except for a sharp drop after the REBP was abolished in TR1s (January 1992). For the age group
55-57 the estimated increase declines over time. The raise in early retirement in the age group
50-54 is driven by a large increase in transitions into disability pensions and, to a lesser extent,
transitions into old-age pensions (top right panel). The bottom middle and the bottom right panel
indicate that for the age group 55-57 there is a decline in transitions into disability pensions and a
large increase in transitions into old-age pensions during the REBP.
Table 7 presents OLS estimates of equation (1) for job losers who live no farther than a 30 minutes
car drive from the border between treated and control regions. Labor market conditions should
be quite similar within this tightly defined geographical area. Thus, spillovers from the problems
in the steel sector in non-treated regions close to the border should be as important as in treated
regions close to the border.
The first row shows that among unemployed in the age group 50-54 there is a 16.7 percentage
point increase in early retirement during the REBP. This estimate is almost identical to the esti-
mate for the full sample reported in Table 3 (17 percentage points). As the second (third) column
illustrates, the increase in transitions into disability pensions (old-age pensions) is roughly 3 per-
centage points smaller (larger) than the estimate for the full sample of 50-54 year old job losers,
but the difference is statistically not significant. Similarly, the third row shows that the effects of
the abolishment of the REBP for 50-54 year old losers living close to the border are quantitatively
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Figure 8: Coefficients of the interactions (djt × TRi) in equation (3) for transitions into early
retirement, disability pensions, and old-age pensions by age group. The dotted lines represent
95-percent confidence interval.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
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similar to the estimates for the full sample.
Turning to the results for the age group 55-57 (columns 4-6), we find that transitions into early
retirement increase by 8.4 percentage points during the REBP and decrease by 8.2 percentage
points after the REBP. These estimates are around 2 percentage points below the estimates for the
full sample, as reported in Table 5. Similarly, as column 6 illustrates, the estimates for transitions
to old-age pensions are around 2-3 percentage points below the estimates for the full sample.
However, these differences are statistically not significant. These results suggest that spillover
effects are quantitatively small for both groups.
Table 7: Effects for unemployed who live within 30 minutes driving time to the border
Age 50-54 Age 55-57
Early Disability Old-age Early Disability Old-age
retirement pension pension retirement pension pension
REBP introduced 0.167*** 0.099** 0.066*** 0.084** -0.131** 0.203***
(D × TR) (0.032) (0.046) (0.024) (0.032) (0.058) (0.048)
REBP abolished -0.176*** -0.116*** -0.058*** -0.082*** 0.140*** -0.220***
(A× TR) (0.026) (0.032) (0.014) (0.022) (0.030) (0.026)
During 0.121*** 0.114*** -0.015 0.333*** 0.465*** -0.129
(D) (0.035) (0.037) (0.019) (0.047) (0.083) (0.079)
After 0.019 0.029 -0.010 0.029 0.000 0.019
(A) (0.025) (0.025) (0.013) (0.035) (0.054) (0.054)
Treated regions 1 -0.012 -0.007 -0.008 0.051 0.012 0.039
(TR1) (0.041) (0.037) (0.014) (0.035) (0.050) (0.048)
Treated regions 2 0.056** 0.054 -0.006 0.092*** 0.032 0.065
(TR2) (0.028) (0.032) (0.015) (0.032) (0.061) (0.051)
R2 0.215 0.142 0.088 0.230 0.095 0.269
Mean in TRs pre-REBP 0.317 0.253 0.039 0.599 0.347 0.242
No. of Obs. 12,057 12,057 12,057 4,953 4,953 4,953
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within
labor market regions. Controls: marital status, education, last annual wage, unemployment, blue collar status,
employment history, tenure in last job, previous industry, age, year and quarter of inflow. Significance levels: *** =
1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
As an additional robustness check we replicate our findings for job losers whose last job was in
the tradable goods sector with the exception of industries that are directly linked with the steel
sector via the factor market (iron and steel product manufacturing) or via the product market (ore
mining). The idea behind this approach is that labor demand prospects in the tradable-goods sector
are less dependent on local economic conditions. Hence, the estimates should be less aﬄicted by
sectoral spillover effects and by spillover effects from treated to non-treated individuals via changes
in local labor demand due to the REBP. OLS estimates of equation (1) for job losers who previously
worked in the tradable goods sector are shown in Table 8. The estimates are quantitatively very
similar to the estimates for the full sample reported in Tables 3 and 5. The only exception is the
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estimated impact of the REBP on transitions into early retirement for the age group 55-57 which
is significantly lower (at the 10%-level) than the corresponding estimate for the full sample.
Table 8: Effects for unemployed whose last job was in the tradable goods sector
Age 50-54 Age 55-57
Early Disability Old-age Early Disability Old-age
retirement pension pension retirement pension pension
REBP introduced 0.170*** 0.135*** 0.031 0.070** -0.148*** 0.220***
(D × TR) (0.028) (0.032) (0.025) (0.034) (0.049) (0.047)
REBP abolished -0.193*** -0.132*** -0.038*** -0.113*** 0.134*** -0.248***
(A× TR) (0.028) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.032) (0.035)
During 0.144*** 0.110*** 0.004 0.212*** 0.364*** -0.165**
(D) (0.030) (0.022) (0.023) (0.055) (0.046) (0.064)
After -0.022 0.019 -0.037** 0.028 0.011 0.015
(A) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.022) (0.033) (0.034)
Treated regions 1 -0.001 0.008 -0.013 0.089** 0.068 0.024
(TR1) (0.040) (0.042) (0.018) (0.036) (0.077) (0.069)
Treated regions 2 0.087*** 0.088*** -0.009 0.113*** 0.074* 0.038
(TR2) (0.026) (0.027) (0.018) (0.035) (0.044) (0.044)
R2 0.211 0.162 0.100 0.225 0.089 0.223
Mean in TRs pre-REBP 0.373 0.291 0.058 0.715 0.396 0.309
No. of Obs. 24,681 24,681 24,681 9,604 9,604 9,604
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within
labor market regions. Controls: marital status, education, last annual wage, unemployment, blue collar status,
employment history, tenure in last job, previous industry, age, year and quarter of inflow. Significance levels: *** =
1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
5.3 Unemployment Inflow
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate a higher inflow of unemployed in treated regions
during the REBP. To examine the impact of the REBP on unemployment inflow in more detail,
Figure 9 plots the quarterly unemployment inflow relative to the total unemployment inflow between
1985 and 1995 in CRs and TRs. There are no particular regional differences in inflow rates before
the REBP starts. Regional UI inflow rates are also similar during the period the program was in
effect except for the quarter just before the REBP was abolished in TR1s. In this quarter the inflow
rate in treated regions is roughly twice as large as the inflow rate in non-treated regions. Similarly,
the inflow rate in treated regions rises substantially in the three quarters before the abolishment of
the REBP (August 1993).
A potential concern for our analysis is that the composition of the excess inflow in REBP
regions is affected by the eligibility status for the program. The increase in unemployment inflow
could either occur because firms are more likely to lay off workers that are eligible for the REBP
or because workers voluntary quit to retire early via the REBP. Winter-Ebmer (2003) finds that
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the increase in unemployment entry is not driven by voluntary quits but by layoffs by firms who
want to get rid of high-tenured and expensive older workers. To ascertain that selective firing does
not affect our results, we first replicate our findings for job losers who start an unemployment
spell before October 1991. The estimates for this sample should be less affected by selective inflow
because during this period there are only small regional differences in unemployment inflow rates,
as shown in Figure 9. In a second robustness check, we additionally exclude job losers whose tenure
or wage in the last job is above the 75th percentile of the tenure or wage distribution.
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Figure 9: Quarterly UI inflow relative to total UI inflow between 01/1985 and 12/1995 in treated
(TRs) and control regions (CRs)
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
The estimates of these two robustness tests are reported in Table 9. Columns 1-3 of Panel A
indicate that the introduction of the REBP had quantitatively similar effects for 50-54 year old
job losers who started an unemployment spell before October 1991 as for the full sample. The
estimates are 1-2 percentage points smaller if we additionally exclude high-tenure and high-wage
individuals (columns 1-3 of Panel B), but they are not significantly different from the estimates for
the full sample reported in Table 3. For the age group 55-57 there is an increase in transitions into
early retirement of 11.5 percentage points during the REBP (column 4 of Panel A), which is almost
identical to the estimate for the full sample (column 1 of Table 5). However, the decline in exits
to disability pensions and the increase in exits to old-age pensions (columns 5 and 6 of Panel A)
are roughly 5 percentage points larger than the corresponding estimates for the full sample. These
differences appears to be driven by job losers with high tenure or high earnings on the previous job
given that excluding unemployed whose previous job tenure or wage is above the 75th percentile of
the tenure or wage distribution yields estimates that are not significantly different from those for
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the full sample (Columns 4-6 of Panel B). In sum, these findings suggest that our estimates are not
affected by selective unemployment inflow.
Table 9: Effects for unemployed entering before 10/1991
Age 50-54 Age 55-57
Early Disability Old-age Early Disability Old-age
retirement pension pension retirement pension pension
A. inflow prior to 10/1991
REBP introduced 0.164*** 0.113*** 0.041** 0.115*** -0.170*** 0.285***
(D × TR) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.030) (0.046) (0.039)
R2 0.174 0.136 0.053 0.227 0.079 0.297
Mean in TRs pre-REBP 0.336 0.269 0.044 0.632 0.374 0.249
No. of Obs. 22,161 22,161 22,161 8,911 8,911 8,911
B. only low tenure/wage
REBP introduced 0.143*** 0.104*** 0.031** 0.128*** -0.125*** 0.245***
(D × TR) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.036) (0.043) (0.041)
R2 0.146 0.113 0.040 0.199 0.084 0.248
Mean in TRs pre-REBP 0.303 0.239 0.034 0.584 0.359 0.217
No. of Obs. 12,966 12,966 12,966 5,173 5,173 5,173
Notes: The Table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within
labor market regions. Controls: marital status, education, last annual wage, unemployment, blue collar status,
employment history, tenure in last job, previous industry, age, year and quarter of inflow. Significance levels: *** =
1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.
6 Social Welfare Analysis
In this section we use our above results to shed light on the welfare implications of extended
UI benefits provided by the REBP. More specifically, we ask whether the benefits provided by the
REBP – the eased access to early retirement in the case of job loss – justified the costs of the REBP
to the taxpayer. We build on the sufficient statistics approach developed by Chetty (2006a) building
on the work of Baily (1978). We develop our argument in three steps. In a first step, we set up
a simple model of early retirement featuring program complementarity and program substitution
effects. In a second step, we use this model and derive an extended Baily-Chetty formula accounting
for multiple retirement pathways. This formula allows us to (locally) evaluate the welfare effects
of providing unemployment benefits as an early retirement program. In a third part we undertake
a calibration exercise that feeds our empirical estimates together with the changes of institutional
environment generated by the REBP into the model.
6.1 Modeling the Early Retirement Decision
Consider the early retirement decision of an older worker. Assuming there is no possibility for
self-insurance, the worker has no savings and has to rely of current earnings or public benefits to
finance current consumption. The worker’s remaining lifetime consists of (at most) three periods
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t = 0, 1, 2. Periods 0 and 1 have length 1 and period 2 has length T .14 In t = 0 and t = 1 the worker
can still work on the labor market. In t = 2 the worker is retired and draws an old-age pension.
To keep things simple (and in the spirit of our empirical analysis) we assume that, during periods
t = 0 and t = 1, the worker can be in only one of three states: UI, DI, or working. Within-period
durations are either 0 or 1, i.e. varying within-period durations are ignored. When losing the job,
the worker either goes back to work immediately or retires early. At t = 2 the worker retires and
draws a regular old-age pension.
Displacement at t = 1. Consider a worker who gets displaced at the beginning of t = 1. If the
worker goes back to work in t = 1 he generates income w. However, in order to find a job, a search
cost θ1 has to be incurred. We think of θ1 as cost and effort of job search as well as the cost to the
worker of adjusting to a new work environment. θ1 is a random variable drawn from a continuous
distribution function F (θ). Alternatively, the worker may retire early at t = 1. Early retirement
through the DI system yields a benefit d. Claiming a disability pension is associated with utility
costs κ reflecting the hassle of a medical check and other bureaucratic obstacles, or stigma-costs
associated with DI status. Early retirement through the UI system yields a benefit b (any costs
associated with claiming UI benefits are normalized to zero).15
In t = 2 the worker draws an old-age pension pW if entering from employment, pD if entering
from the DI system, and pU if entering from the UI system. Assuming that workers do not save
and ignoring discounting, the lifetime utilities from going back to work, W1 − θ1, retiring early by
claiming a disability pension, D1, and retiring early by claiming UI benefits, U1, are given by
W1 − θ1 = u(w)− θ1 + Tu(pW ), D1 = u(d)− κ+ Tu(pD), U1 = u(b) + Tu(pU ).
To make progress, we assume the welfare benefits d, pD, pU and pW are related to each other in
ways that capture the Austrian welfare benefit system. According to the Austrian rules outlined in
Section 2, workers entering regular retirement directly from DI get an old-age pension equal to the
previous disability pension in period 1, pD = d. In contrast, unemployed and employed workers’
old-age pension equals the (potential) disability pension in t = 1, augmented by some factor α > 1,
or pW = pU = αd.16 Given these rules, heterogeneity in disability pensions and old-age pensions is
captured by the parameter d.
14Period t = 0 can be associated with ages 50-54, period t = 1 with ages 55-59, and period t = 2 with ages 60+.
This captures the early retirement incentives of the Austrian system: extended UI benefits of the REBP become
available at age 50; relaxed access to disability pensions at age 55, and regular old-age pensions at age 60.
15We think of the UI benefit b as the UI transfer when staying unemployed throughout one period. b is a weighted
average UI benefits bu and UI assistance with b = τbu+ (1− τ)ba. We think of τ as the maximum duration of regular
UI benefits bu. Eligibility to the REBP is associated with an increase of in τ from 0.2 (1 year of the 5-year period)
to 0.8 (4 years of a 5-year period).
16As outlined in Section 2, the pension pt+1 is given by the assessment basis ωˆt+1 times the pension coefficient
at+1. Assuming that the assessment basis remains constant ωˆt+1 = ωˆt, we obtain pt+1 = ptα with α = at+1/at.
Notice that we have assumed pW = pU . This is justified as long as the assessment basis remains constant, because
periods of unemployment and periods of unemployment affect the pension coefficient in the same way. Employment
and unemployment periods are both counted as insurance years. We will calibrate α such that empirical moments
are matched.
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Lemma 1. (i) The worker will claim a disability pension rather than UI benefits if d ≥ dˆ, where dˆ
satisfies u(b) = u(dˆ)− T (u(αdˆ)− u(dˆ))− κ. (ii) The worker will retire early rather than go back to
work, if θ1 ≥ θˆ1, where θˆ1 = u (ω)− u(b) if d < dˆ and θˆ1(d) = u (ω)− u(d) + T (u(αd)− u(d)) + κ
if d ≥ dˆ. Moreover, ∂θˆ1/∂d ≤ 0 if 1− (α− 1)T ≥ 0.
Figure 10 illustrates individuals’ optimal choices in t = 1 given their location in (θ1, d) space.
The threshold dˆ says that individuals choose an early retirement path through the UI system when
a disability pension falls short of the critical value dˆ. This reflects part (i) of the Lemma. The
threshold θˆ1 is flat for d < dˆ, and decreases in d for d ≥ dˆ. At low values of d, early retirement
occurs through the UI system rather than the DI system, hence the level of the disability pension
is irrelevant for the early retirement decision. However, at high values of d, early retirement occurs
via the DI system and individuals with a higher disability pension are more likely to retire early.
This reflects part (ii) of the Lemma.17
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Figure 10: Left panel: early retirement thresholds in t = 1. Right panel: program complementarity
effects (c) as well as program substitution effects (s) when unemployment benefits increase from b
to b′.
How do incentives change when UI benefits become more generous? It is straightforward to
see from the above Lemma that the dˆ-threshold shifts to the right. This reflects the program
substitution effect: early retirees use the DI system under less generous UI rules but take up UI
benefits under more generous UI rules. Moreover, the θˆ1-threshold shifts down. This reflects the
program complementarity effect of higher UI benefits: individuals go back to work under the less
generous UI system, but use UI benefits as a bridge to an old-age pension under more generous UI
benefits. This leads to the following proposition.
17A sufficient condition for a negative slope is 1−(α−1)T ≥ 0 or, equivalently, (pW −pD)T ≤ d. Future gains from
postponing retirement (pW − pD)T are lower than current gains from DI take-up d. Delaying retirement is unfair at
the margin. This is the relevant case under Austrian disability and old-age pension rules (Hofer and Koman, 2006).
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Proposition 1. Consider workers who get displaced in period t = 1. More generous UI benefits
increase early retirement due to the program complementarity effect. More generous UI benefits
increase the UI rather than the DI pathway due to the program substitution effect.
Displacement at t = 0. Now consider a worker who gets displaced at the beginning of period
t = 0. For such an individual, there are two options. First, the worker may choose early retirement
in t = 0. We assume that this requires a sequential take-up of different welfare programs: UI
benefits b in t = 0 and a disability pension d in t = 1.18 In t = 2 the workers gets an old-age
pension pD = d.
The second option for the worker is returning to work in t = 0. Going back to work yields utility
u(w) but is associated with a search cost θ0 that has to be incurred at the beginning of t = 0. Like
before, we assume that θ0 is a random draw from the distribution function F (θ). Provided θ0 is
low enough, the worker will go back to work. In t = 1 the workers keeps his job with probability
1− q and is fired with probability q. We abstract from selective firing, hence q is the same for all
workers. If the worker keeps his job, he earns a wage w also in t = 1 without having to bear search
costs. If fired, the worker faces exactly the same decision problem as described in “Displacement
at t = 1”. We assume that the search costs after displacement at the beginning of t = 1, θ1, are
independently drawn from the same distribution F (θ) as the search costs after displacement at the
beginning of t = 0, θ0.
19 In t = 2 the worker draws an old-age pension that depends on employment
or benefit-status in t = 1, with pD = d and pW = pU = αd > d.
In sum, the lifetime utilities at t = 0 from going back to work, W0− θ0, and from retiring early,
R0, can be written as:
W0 − θ0 = u(w)− θ0 + qEθV1 + (1− q)W1, R0 = u(b) + (1 + T )u(d)− κ,
where EθV1 ≡
´
max(W1− θ,D1, U1)dF (θ) is the expected utility when losing the job in t = 1. Let
us consider the worker’s optimal choice in t = 0, focusing on heterogeneity in the variables θ0 and
d. We denote by θˆ0(d) the critical level of θ that keeps the worker indifferent between retirement
early and going back to work.
Lemma 2. The worker will retire early if θ0 ≥ θˆ0(d), and will go back to work otherwise. When
1− (α− 1)T ≥ 0, we have ∂θˆ0/∂d ≤ 0.
18We rule out an early retirement path where the individual draws either a disability pension or UI benefits in
both periods. We rule out a disability pension in both periods because, under Austrian rules, the DI program as
an early-retirement scheme (“relaxed access to disability”) is only available at t = 1 but not at t = 0. We rule
out drawing UI benefits in both periods because regular UI benefits have limited duration. While UI assistance is
unlimited, benefits are lower and means-tested, and hence dominated by drawing a disability pension in the second
period. Finally, we assume a worker’s human capital fully depreciates if he is not working at all in t = 0. Hence
careers where individuals fully exhaust UI in t = 0 and then go back to work in t = 1 are ruled out.
19This implies that average search costs for worker fired in t = 1 are higher than the average search costs when fired
in t = 0. Workers fired in t = 1 must have been re-employed after being fired in t = 0 meaning their draw θ0 must
have been sufficiently low to induce them going back to work. Average search costs conditional on re-employment
are Eθ(θ | θ ≤ θ0). In contrast, θ1 is a new independent draw from the same distribution F (θ) that is not conditional
on re-employment. Hence average search costs of workers fired in t = 1 are Eθ(θ) > Eθ(θ | θ ≤ θ0).
31
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 11 illustrates individuals’ optimal choices in t = 0 given the location in (θ0, d) space.
The threshold θˆ0 is downward sloping in d. The flat segment that shows up in the early retirement
choice at t = 1 (see Figure 10 above), does not exist for the early retirement choice at t = 0. The
reason is that, under our assumptions, the only feasible early retirement path is drawing UI benefits
at t = 0 and a disability pension at t = 1. Since early retirees have to rely on a disability pension,
early retirement is discouraged at very low values of d.
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Figure 11: Left panel: early retirement threshold θˆ0(d; b) in t = 0. Right panel: program comple-
mentarity effects (c) when unemployment benefits increase from b to b′.
We are now able to explore how more generous UI benefits affects early retirement incentives
in t = 0. A higher b has two countervailing effects on the threshold θˆ0(d; b). On the one hand, a
higher b increase the incentive to use UI and DI sequentially: program complementarity increases
the value of early retirement R0. One the other hand, higher benefits also increase the value of
going back to work. This entitlement effect (Mortensen, 1977) increases the value of going back to
work at t = 0 because becoming unemployed in t = 1 is less harmful. We summarize our discussion
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. More generous UI benefits b lead to a program complementarity effect and an
entitlement effect. The former increases and the latter decreases the probability to retire early at
t = 0. The program complementarity effect dominates.
Proof. See Appendix.
6.2 An Extended Baily-Chetty Formula for Early Retirement
We now look at the social optimality of the REBP as an early retirement program. We proceed
by describing the social planner’s problem. The social planner has to take into account how older
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workers react to changing incentives. Moreover, the social planner also has to take into account
that younger individuals are affected since the additional tax burden associated with more generous
benefits is shared among the entire population. We therefore extend the above model for one
additional period, t = −1, during which the worker is not yet eligible to the more generous UI early
retirement pathway. Assume period t = −1 has length ϕ and that younger individuals are fully
employed.20 Employed workers contribute payroll taxes τ , so the gross wage w equals w = ω + τ .
We normalize the size of a cohort to unity and assume the population is stationary. Heterogeneity
in pension benefits among individuals is captured by the distribution G(d) over the domain [d, d].
The utilitarian social welfare equals
W =
ˆ d
d
(
ϕu (w − τ) + q
ˆ ∞
0
V0(d, θ)dF (θ) + (1− q)W0(d)
)
dG(d) (4)
and represents the average expected lifetime utility among all individuals. The expected value over
the periods t = 0 to t = 2 is recursively defined: at the beginning of t = 0 individuals either (i)
become unemployed with probability q, draw job search disutility θ, and choose pathways according
to V0 = max{W0 − θ,R0} or (ii) stay employed with probability (1− q) and obtain utility W0. As
outlined in Section 6.1, the pathway utilities W0 and R0 then comprise the subsequent periods as
well.
To characterize the government’s budget constraint, we need to introduce new notation. First,
let piit denote the probability that a worker displaced at the end of t − 1 enters state i = W,U,D
during t. Recall that workers cannot enter state D in period t = 0 (see footnote 18). Hence we
have piW0 = 1 − piU0 and piW1 = 1 − piU1 − piD1 . Second, denote by Πit the mass of workers in state
i = U,D,W at date t. Since cohort size equals unity, we have ΠU0 = qpi
U
0 , Π
D
0 = 0, Π
W
0 = 1− ΠU0 ;
and ΠU1 = q(1− qpiU0 )piU1 , ΠD1 = q(1− qpiU0 )piD1 , ΠW1 = 1−ΠU0 −ΠU1 −ΠD1 .21
A balanced government budget requires that expenditures on UI, DI and old-age pensions have
to be financed by taxes paid by the entire working population. This can be written as
(ΠU0 + Π
U
1 )b+N = (ϕ+ Π
W
0 + Π
W
1 )τ, (5)
where N denotes government expenditures on disability and old-age pensions (described in Ap-
pendix A.1).
We can now derive a sufficient statistic in the spirit of Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006a) that
allows us to assess the welfare implications of extended UI.22 The government maximizes social
20We ignore unemployment risks for the young because we focus on long-term unemployment benefits targeted to
older workers that incentives them to retire early.
21The above notation also refers to alternative (early) retirement pathways: ΠU0 workers choose the pathway UD;
ΠU1 choose pathway WU ; Π
D
1 choose pathway WD; and Π
W
1 workers choose WW . Since cohort size is unity, we have
ΠU0 + Π
U
1 + Π
D
1 + Π
W
1 = 1. Pathways UU, DD, UW and DW are ruled out by assumption, see footnote 18.
22Our framework focuses only on the extensive margin (early retirement versus returning to work after a job loss)
which allows us, in a simple way to consider complementarity and substitution effects of UI and DI. This is different
from Baily and Chetty who consider a single program (UI) and who focus on the intensive margin (duration of
unemployment).
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welfare (4) with respect to b subject to the government budget constraint (5). This yields the
first-order condition:
dW
db
= (ΠU0 + Π
U
1 )u
′(b)− (ϕ+ ΠW0 + ΠW1 )u′(w − τ)
dτ
db
!
= 0. (6)
Optimal UI benefits equate the marginal social benefits of better insurance to the marginal social
costs of higher taxes. On the one hand, higher UI benefits provide better insurance in the case of
job loss. The marginal social benefit from better insurance is given by the mass of UI beneficiaries
in t = 0 and t = 1, ΠU0 + Π
U
1 , times their marginal utility gain, u
′(b). On the other hand, higher
UI benefits require higher taxes on employed workers. The marginal social cost from higher taxes
are given by the mass of employed workers during work life, ϕ + ΠW0 + Π
W
1 , times their marginal
utility loss, u′(w−τ) (dτ/db) . Notice that the utility effects of workers’ labor supply and retirement
responses are second-order (Envelope Theorem) and do not show up directly in the above condition
(although they show up indirectly in the term dτ/db).
Let us take a closer look at dτ/db, the increase in taxes necessary to finance the more generous
UI system.23 For job losers in t = 0, extended UI induces individuals who would have otherwise gone
back to work, to retire early through sequential take-up of UI and DI (program complementarity).
We denote the total effect on net government expenditures by ∆c0. Notice that early retirement in
t = 0 has an impact on taxes and/or transfers in t = 0, t = 1, and t = 2. In t = 0, the government
has to pay UI benefits and forgoes the taxes the workers would have paid when going back to work
rather than retiring early. Hence an additional early retiree generates a loss for the government
equal to b + τ . In t = 1, the government has to pay disability pensions and forgoes taxes (and
saves UI benefits) on those who would have otherwise worked (become unemployed). In t = 2,
expenditures for old-age pensions are lower because early retirement in t = 0 requires take-up of
DI in t = 1 which lead to lower pensions compared to the alternative scenario of being employed
or unemployed before pension take-up. In Appendix A.2, we explicitly calculate ∆c0.
For job losers in t = 1, extended UI induces both program complementarity and program
substitution. Here program complementarity means the sequential take-up of UI benefits and an
old-age pension. Some workers now retire early via UI instead of continuing to work. Government’s
additional financial burden becomes ∆c1 = b+τ . There is no impact on government expenditures in
t = 2 because pensions do not depend on whether new pension claimants were previously employed
or unemployed. In contrast, program substitution in t = 1 affects the government budget through
future pensions. For each worker who substitutes UI for DI, the government pays UI benefits b and
normal old age pension pU = αd. Had the worker instead retired early via DI benefits, this would
23To keep things simple, we assume that the required tax increase does not generate an increase in the mass of
individuals claiming DI rather than returning to work. This assumption can be made precise using Figure 10 (right
panel) which draws the impact of an increase in UI benefits. The implicit assumption in Figure 10 is that the net
wage remains constant. When the net wage falls because of higher taxes, the downward sloping branch in the figure
shifts down as well. The above assumption implies that the downward shift is small and affected individuals do not
change their behavior. Notice, however, that this assumption is not particularly strong because the group that may
consider switching to DI is a small proportion of all taxpayers. It consists of individuals at age t = 1 with d > dˆ and
θ1 ≥ θˆ1 switching to DI rather than continue to work as a result of the higher taxes.
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have affected the government budget with d in t = 1 and pension pD = d in t = 2. Hence program
substitution induces net government expenditures ∆s1 = b+ Tp
U − (1 + T )d.24
The second set of parameters that is relevant to calculate the marginal costs of extended UI are
workers’ employment and retirement responses. We capture these behavioral effects by the following
elasticities: (i) εc0 = (dpi
U
0 /pi
U
0 )/(db/b) is the elasticity of UI recipients in t = 0 with respect to the
UI benefit level. This elasticity captures the program complementarity effect in t = 0, i.e. the
increase in sequential take-up of UI and DI. (ii) εc1 = −(dpiW1 /piU1 )/(db/b) is the percentage increase
of UI recipients who take-up UI in t = 1 rather than continue to work. This elasticity captures
the program complementarity effect at t = 1, i.e. the increase in sequential take-up of UI and an
old-age pension. Finally, (iii) εs1 = −(dpiD1 /piU1 )/(db/b) is the percentage increase in UI recipients
who take up UI instead of DI in t = 1. This elasticity captures the program substitution effect.
The following Lemma relates the elasticities ε and ∆ to the overall fiscal impact.
Lemma 3. An increase in UI benefits leads to an increase in expenditures and forgone tax revenues,
E ,
E = ΠU0
(
1 + εc0
∆c0
b
)
+ ΠU1
(
1 + εc1
∆c1
b
+ εs1
∆s1
b
)
. (7)
Proof. See Appendix.
Equation (7) in the above Lemma shows two effects: (i) the mechanical effect, ΠU0 + Π
U
1 , that
arises because more generous UI benefits have to paid to the unemployed both in t = 0 and
t = 1; and (ii) the behavioral effects that arise due to program complementarity and program
substitution. These latter effects correspond to the mass of individuals who take advantage of
program complementarity, ΠU0 (ε
c
0/b), and Π
U
1 (ε
c
1/b), weighted by their respective financial impacts,
∆c0 and ∆
c
1.
We are now ready to state our main result which shows how optimal UI benefits depend on
workers’ degree of risk aversion and the elasticities of program complementarity and program sub-
stitution. A balanced budget requires that marginal expenditures and foregone taxes are equal to
marginal tax revenues, or E = (ϕ+ ΠW0 + ΠW1 )(dτ/db). Combining this with equations (6) and (7)
yields
Proposition 3. Optimal UI benefits for older workers satisfy
u′(b)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) = ε
c
0
∆c0
b
ΠU0
ΠU0 + Π
U
1
+
(
εc1
∆c1
b
+ εs1
∆s1
b
)
ΠU1
ΠU0 + Π
U
1
. (8)
The l.h.s. of formula (8) captures the marginal benefit of smoother consumption while the
r.h.s. quantifies the costs associated with distorted labor supply and early retirement choices. This
formula extends the Baily-Chetty and allows substitution and complementarity - two aspects that
24Notice that the model assumes heterogeneity in d and θ. Government expenditures are affected by average DI
pension among those who react to the UI extension. See the proof to Lemma B.3 in the Appendix.
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are not present in the standard Baily-Chetty framework.25 Notice that the length of the work
life ϕ and the distribution of search costs θ, F (θ), do not directly appear in the above formula.
However, they appear indirectly because a higher ϕ implies a lower taxes τ relaxing the overall tax
burden allowing for higher benefit generosity for older individuals. F (θ) does not affect the above
formula because individuals’ utility is additively separable in search costs θ and consumption c.
Hence θ has no impact on marginal consumption values.
6.3 Calibration
This section calibrates formula (8). We assume CRRA utility u(c) = c1−γ/(1 − γ), with the
relative risk aversion parameter γ. Then the l.h.s. of equation (8) is RR(b)−γ − 1 where RR(b)
denotes the replacement rate of UI benefits in terms of after tax income (w − τ). Notice that
RR(b) captures the replacement rate over a five-year interval, hence we have RR(b) = 0.42 before
the REBP (1/5 regular UI benefits and 4/5 UI assistance) and RR(b) = 0.52 during the REBP
(4/5 regular UI benefits and 1/5 UI assistance).26 To estimate the r.h.s. of formula (8), we take
our results from Table 3 which estimates an increase in the transition from UI to DI (program
complementarity) of ∆piU0 = 0.126, starting from the pre-REBP mean of pi
U
0 = 0.269 (see second-
to-last row in Table 3). Hence the elasticity of program complementarity in t = 0 is given by
εc0 =
∆piU0 /pi
U
0
∆b/b
=
0.126/0.269
0.10/0.42
= 1.97.
In t = 1 workers’ responses consist of both program complementarity and program substitution
effects. We take our estimates of Table 5 and decompose the total old-age pension treatment effect
(∆piU1 = 0.231) into a program substitution (−∆piD1 = 0.127) and a program complementarity effect
(−∆piW1 = 0.108). The mean for transitions from UI to old-age pensions in treated regions before
the REBP equals piU1 = 0.249 (see second-to-last column of Table 5). This yields
εc1 =
−∆piW1 /piU1
∆b/b
=
0.108/0.249
0.10/0.42
= 1.82 and εs1 =
−∆piD1 /piU1
∆b/b
=
0.127/0.249
0.10/0.42
= 2.14.
Next, we calculate factual and counterfactual pensions to get the impact of workers’ behavioral
responses on the government buget (the ∆’s). We use the following parameter values: (i) an after-
tax DI replacement rate of 70 percent in both periods t = 0 and t = 1; (ii) a pension appreciation
factor α = 1.1 over a five-year interval (capturing a 1.9 percent increase per annum in the average
25When ΠU0 = 0 and ε
s
1 = 0, only program complementarity in t = 1 is at work. In that case we have a standard
optimal UI problem in which workers have only the choice between going back to work or drawing UI in period
t = 1. The r.h.s of formula (8) becomes εc1(∆
c
1/b) with ∆
c
1 = τ + b. The government budget constraint becomes
b(1 − piW1 ) = piW1 τ and the Baily-Chetty formula becomes get (u′(b) − u′(w − τ))/u′(w − τ) = εc1/piW1 . The slight
difference of this formula to the standard case arises from our focus on the extensive margin (unemployment entry:
yes/no), while Baily-Chetty look at the duration of unemployment.
26Our calibration intends to represent Austrian UI rules around 1990. We assume a net replacement rate of regular
UI benefits of 55% and a net replacement rate of UI assistance of around 38.5%, or 70% of regular UI benefits.
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pension); and (iii) total payroll taxes, including employee and employer contributions, are about
25% of the gross wage. Table 10 lists the estimated costs from workers’ responses, separately for
program complementary and program substitution (both in relative terms and in year-2000 Euros).
Table 10: Financial impact of program complementarity and program substitution
In Thousands of
Percent of net wage Euros (year 2000)
∆c0 = b+ τˆ + (d+ Tp
D)− T0 0.42 + 0.33 + 0.70 + 2.49− 2.51 = 1.43 182
∆c1 = b+ τˆ 0.42 + 0.33 = 0.75 95
∆s1 = b+ Tp
U − (d+ TpD) 0.42 + 2.74− 0.70− 2.49 = −0.03 −4
Notes: The second column reports the financial effects in units of the net (after-tax wage). Hence b = 0.42 denotes
the UI benefits replacement ratio; d = pD = 0.7 the DI benefit replacement ratio for individuals reacting to the UI
benefits change. In 1990, the conditional lifetime expectation of a 60 year old male individual was about 17.8 years
(see Statistik Austria, 2012), which yields T = 3.56 capturing the duration of t = 2 in terms of 5-year periods. It
follows that TpD = 0.7 × 3.56 = 2.49 and TpU = αTpD = 2.74. Payroll taxes are recalculated as a fraction of net-
wages, hence we get τˆ = τ/(1− τ) = 0.33. T0 denotes the expected net transfer in the counterfactual scenario when
a job loser goes back work (rather than retiring early) in t = 0. See Appendix A.2 for a comprehensive calibration
of this term. The ∆-terms Euro are transferred into year-2000 Euros by multiplying the ∆-terms by 1825 (number
of days in a five-year interval) and by 69.4 (the average daily wage in treated regions during the REBP-program, see
Table 2).
Table 10 reveals two important findings. First, complementarity effects in t = 0 are almost twice
as expensive as complementarity effects in t = 1. Our calibration shows that each early retiree in
t = 0 imposes an overall burden on the government budget, both forgone taxes and additional
benefits, of 182,000 Euros (baseline-year 2000). This seems to be a rather large number, but one
has to keep in mind that complementarity means retiring 10 years prior to normal retirement age.
Each additional early retiree in period t = 1 imposes an overall burden on the government of 95,000
Euros. Program substitution in t = 1 enters negatively, e.g. the government saves money for each
retirement pathway change. This may be explained by the transactions costs associated with access
to DI (modeled by the disutility κ). Individuals substitute DI for UI even though the latter pays
lower benefits because the DI application disutility can be avoided. However, the effect on the
government budget is rather small (- 4,000 Euros).
The weighting factors ΠU0 /(Π
U
0 + Π
U
1 ) and Π
U
1 /(Π
U
0 + Π
U
1 ) are almost symmetric with 0.53 and
0.47, respectively.27 Collecting all r.h.s. terms of equation (8) yields
0.53× 1.97× 1.43
0.42
+ 0.47×
(
1.82× 0.75
0.42
− 2.14× 0.03
0.42
)
= 3.56 + (1.54− 0.07) = 5.02. (9)
Looking at the relative shares provides the following insights. First, complementarity effects are
very expensive both because individuals react very strongly to financial incentives and because early
27 We find an average employment to unemployment transition rate of 3% per annum. This estimate includes all
50-57 years old workers satisfying the sample selection criteria (Section 3) and living in one of the REBP regions
during the policy change. The corresponding five year period estimate amounts to q = 5 × 3% = 15% which yields
ΠU0 = 4.0% and Π
U
1 = 3.6%.
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retirement in t = 0 implies long-lasting (10-year) benefit payments and foregone taxes. Second,
complementarity effects in t = 1 are half as expensive due to the shorter (5-year) period over which
the government budget is affected. Third, program substitution effects mitigate program costs but
are quantitatively small. The above calibration let us calculate a hypothetical risk aversion level
γh that satisfies the local optimality condition
γh = − ln(1 + r.h.s. of equation 8)
lnRR(b)
= − ln(1 + 5.02)
ln 0.42
= 2.07. (10)
Despite its importance the value of relative risk aversion remains disputed. In particular, a
large literature finds that risk aversion is context-specific and varies with the scale of the risk
(Chetty and Szeidl (2007), Barseghyan et al. (2011), Einav et al. (2012)). Studies that use labor
supply elasticities to estimate risk aversion come closest to our setting. Using 33 sets of estimates
of wage and income elasticities, Chetty (2006b) finds that the mean implied risk aversion is 0.71
with a range of 0.15 to 1.78. Since our estimate of risk aversion is above this range (γ = 2.07), we
conclude that the REBP was most likely too generous. This finding seems to be plausible given
that UI benefits serve as an important bridge (complementarity effects) for the unemployed to a
very generous pension system. Of course, this statement is contingent on the very generous pension
system in place, and restricting eligibility or increasing age thresholds may be other valid policies
to lower program costs.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how extended unemployment insurance (UI) benefits targeted to older
workers affect early retirement and social welfare. Extended durations of UI benefits for older
workers are an important element of early retirement schemes in many countries. To identify the
impact of the maximum duration of UI benefits on the incidence of early retirement, we exploit the
Austrian regional extended benefits program (REBP) that was in place between June 1988 and July
1993. This policy constitutes a large policy intervention extending regular UI benefits to 4 years
for workers aged 50+ living in certain regions, while workers in non-REBP regions were eligible
to 1 year of regular UI benefits. Our identification strategy is based on a difference-in-differences
comparison of individuals in REBP-regions to individuals in non-REBP regions, before, during,
and after the program.
We find that the REBP had a dramatic effect on the incidence of early retirement. The prob-
ability that an unemployment entrants aged 50-54 (55-57) retires early is 17.0 (10.8) percentage
points higher among individuals eligible to the REBP. Among unemployment entrants aged 50-54
program complementarity (i.e. sequential take-up of UI and DI) is quantitatively important: of
the 17 percentage point increase in early retirement, 12.6 percentage points are associated with
increased UI take-up followed by higher DI take-up. Among unemployment entrants aged 55 to 57,
both program complementarity (i.e. sequential take-up of UI and retirement benefits) and program
substitution (i.e. higher UI take-up but lower DI benefit claims) are quantitatively relevant. The
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10.8 percentage point increase in excess retirement consists of a 23.1 percentage point increase in
individuals staying on UI before claiming regular retirement benefits; and a 12.7 percentage point
reduction in individuals claiming DI benefits.
Our empirical estimates help to explore whether extending UI benefits for older workers was a
socially optimal policy. We set up a simple early retirement model and implement the sufficient
statistics approach proposed by Chetty (2006a). Our model captures both program complementar-
ity and program substitution effects and establishes a simple rule for optimality of more generous
UI benefits for older job losers. Using our empirical estimates, we conclude that, extending UI
benefits for the elderly is welfare-improving only if the degree of risk aversion exceeds 2.07. This
estimate is higher than most previous estimates that use labor supply elasticities to identify risk
aversion (Chetty, 2006b). We therefore conclude that the REBP was most likely a suboptimal
policy.
We think that our analysis is of general interest. On the one hand, policy makers in many
countries implemented early retirement schemes. These schemes are not only very costly but also
highly controversial. In many countries reforms are debated or under way to reduce the generosity
of these schemes. Austria provides an interesting case study because early retirement schemes
were used disproportionately to mitigate labor market problems of older workers. Moreover, the
REBP provides an interesting example to understand labor supply reactions caused by strong
interventions in retirement schemes. On the other hand, the Austrian early retirement system
works qualitatively similar than in most other countries. In particular, in many countries eligibility
criteria for DI benefits are relaxed for older workers and potential UI benefit durations are extended
above certain age thresholds. This suggests that our results are relevant also for other countries
whose retirement systems have similar features.
From a policy perspective, our study suggests that policy reforms aiming at increasing the
effective retirement age should take particular care to carefully consider the entire set of welfare
programs that impact the (early) retirement decision. A policy mix that allows for simultaneous
and coordinated reforms in UI and DI programs to tackle the unemployment-disability margin,
together with complementary measures that induce firms to hire and retain older workers are the
most promising route for policy reforms.
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A Pensions
A.1 Definition of disability and old-age pension expenditures
N denotes government expenditures (DI and old-age pensions, but not UI benefits). N and can
be subdivided into three components {Nt}t=0,1,2, where Nt denotes total expenditures in period
t or later, that arises from a worker retiring in t. Let Et be the expectation of d, conditional on
retirement in t. There are ΠU0 individuals who retire in t = 0. They cause total pension expenditures
N0 = Π
U
0 E0((1 + T )d | θ > θˆ0(d))·
There are ΠD1 + Π
U
1 individuals who retire in t = 1. They cause DI- and pension expenditures
N1 = Π
D
1 E1((1 + T )d | θ > θˆ1(d), d > dˆ) + ΠU1 E1(αTd | θ > θˆ1(d), d < dˆ).
Finally, there are ΠW1 individuals who retire not before t = 2. These workers can be divided into
three groups: (i) ΠW11 , workers displaced at the beginning of t = 1 who return to work, (ii) Π
W2
1 ,
workers displaced in t = 0 who return to work in t = 0 and continue to work in t = 1, and (iii)
ΠW31 , workers without displacement in t = 0 and t = 1. Workers in Π
W1
1 and Π
W2
1 tend to have
a lower d because they self-selected themselves into work because of both low DI pensions d and
low adjustment costs θ. The sum of old-age pensions that accrue to the government by all three
subgroups is
N2 = Π
W1
1 E1(αTd | θ < θˆ1(d)) + ΠW21 E0(αTd | θ < θˆ0(d)) + ΠW31 E0(αTd).
Notice that workers without a previous displacement (third term) are not subject to previous
self-selection. Hence, the mean E0 is unconditional.
A.2 Calibration of T0
The expected financial burden to the government of a job loser who goes back work (rather
than retiring early) in t = 0 equals (see proof in Appendix Lemma B.3)
T0 = q(pˆiD(d0 + TpD0 ) + pˆiU (b+ TpU0 ) + pˆiW (TpW0 − τ)) + (1− q)(TpW0 − τ). (11)
The first component captures government expenditures caused by individuals retiring in t = 1
through claiming DI-benefits; the second term captures expenditures caused by early retirees who
claim UI benefits in t = 1; and the third term captures expenditures caused by workers retiring not
until the regular retirement age t = 2. To calculate T0, we set the probability of job loss q = 0.15
(see footnote 27). We estimate pˆii by the observed take-up probabilities of 55-57 year old job losers
living in REBP regions. This yields pˆiD = 0.33, pˆiU = 0.58, and pˆiW = 0.09. Moreover we use
T = 3.56, d = pD = 0.7, and pU = pW = αd = 0.77, see Table 10.
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B Proofs
B.1 Lemma 2
Proof. Set the value of working (W0− θ0) equal to the value of early retirement (R0) to obtain the
threshold value θˆ0. Differentiation of θˆ0 with respect to d yields
∂θˆ0/∂d = q(∂EθV1/∂d) + (1− q)αTu′(αd)− (1 + T )u′(d).
To calculate EθV1, we need to distinguish two cases (see Lemma 1).
Case 1 (d < dˆ): This is the subset of job losers who strictly prefer to retire through UI rather
than DI in t = 1. The back-to-work probability equals to F (θˆ1) while early retirement occurs with
probability 1−F (θˆ1). The expected marginal utility corresponds to the sum of the marginal utility
of continuing work and the marginal utility of retiring through UI, weighted by their respective
take-up probabilities
∂EθV1/∂d = F (θˆ1)(∂W1/∂d) + (1− F (θˆ1))(∂U1/∂d),
with ∂W1/∂d = ∂U1/∂d = αTu
′(αd). Collecting ∂θˆ0/∂d-terms, and noting that u′(αd) < u′(d)
and 1− (α− 1)T ≥ 0, we get ∂θˆ0/∂d < −u′(d)(1− (α− 1)T ) < 0.
Case 2 (d > dˆ): This is the subset of job losers who strictly prefer to retire through DI rather
than UI in t = 1. The same reasoning as above yields28
∂EθV1/∂d = F (θˆ1)(∂W1/∂d) + (1− F (θˆ1))(∂D1/∂d),
with ∂W1/∂d = αTu
′(αd) and ∂D1/∂d = (1 + T )u′(d). Collecting ∂θˆ0/∂d-terms and again using
1− (α− 1)T ≥ 0 yields ∂θˆ0/∂d < −(1− q(1− F1(θˆ1)))u′(d)(1− (α− 1)T ) < 0.
B.2 Proposition 2
Proof. Differentiation of θˆ0 with respect to b yields ∂θˆ0/∂b = q ·(∂EθV1/∂b)−u′(b). As in Lemma 2,
there are two cases. Case 1 (d < dˆ) we obtain ∂EθV1/∂b = (1−F (θˆ1))(∂U1/∂b) which represents the
marginal utility gains of retirement weighted by the probability to retire early. Welfare effects due
to switching behavior are second order because individuals optimize in t = 1 (Envelope Theorem).
Hence, θˆ0(d) decreases in b because 0 < q < 1 and 0 ≤ F (θˆ1) ≤ 1. Case 2 (d > dˆ) yields
∂EθV1/∂b = 0 as the UI pathway is never chosen and therefore ∂θˆ0/∂b = −u′(b).
28There is one subtle difference to Case 1: the threshold θˆ1 becomes a function of d over the domain d > dˆ. However,
utility effects due to changes in the threshold θˆ1 are second-order because individuals optimize over pathway choices
(Envelope Theorem).
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B.3 Lemma 3
First, we assume that dτ/db does not generate an increase in the mass of individuals claiming
DI rather than returning to work; see discussion in footnote (23). Second, the elasticities εs1 and
εc1 capture pathway changes holding the t = 1 inflow of displaced workers fixed (more precise
definition). A detailed proof can be found in the Mathematical Appendix.
Proof. Differentiation of the budget constraint (5) with respect to b yields
(ϕ+ ΠW0 + Π
W
1 )
dτ
db
+ τ
d(ΠW0 + Π
W
1 )
db
= ΠU0 + Π
U
1 + b
d(ΠU0 + Π
U
1 )
db
+
dN
db
. (12)
In a first step, we calculate the marginal pension expenditures dN/db (pensions see Appendix A.1).
Deriving N0 with respect to b yields
dN0/db = Π
U
0 (ε
c
0/b)(1 + T )d0 (13)
which are additional pension expenditures (1+T )d0 caused by more early retirees in t = 0. Deriving
N1 +N2 with respect to b yields
d(N1 +N2)/db = Π
U
1 (ε
s
1/b)(Tp
U
1 − d1 − TpD1 ) (14)
−ΠU0 (εc0/b)(q(pˆiD(d0 + TpD0 ) + pˆiUTpU0 + pˆiWTpW0 ) + (1− q)TpW0 )
which are additional DI and old-age pension expenditures caused by the change in the number
of (early) retirees in t = 1 and t = 2 . pˆiD denotes the fraction of DI pension take-up in t = 1
of individuals who react to program complementarity effects in t = 0. pˆiU and pˆiW capture the
unemployment and work margin. The above formula shows two channels affecting total pension
expenditures accruing from retirement in t = 1, 2. The first term captures the costs of program
substitution (change in DI plus old-age pension expenditures) form retirees that use UI instead of
DI to retire early. The second term captures the fact that, when there are more retirees in t = 0,
there are fewer retirees in t = 1 and t = 2 which reduces the government expenditures N1 +N2.
In the second step, we calculate the additional UI expenditures caused by labor supply responses
d(ΠU0 + Π
U
1 )/db× b = ΠU0 (εc0/b)(1− qpˆiU )b+ ΠU1 ((εc1 + εs1)/b)b. (15)
Again, the first term captures net costs due to early retirement in t = 0 including savings due
to non-retirement in t = 1, captured by qpˆiU . The second term represents additional UI bene-
fits expenditures due to substitution and complementarity effects in t = 1. Applying the same
procedure:
d(ΠW0 + Π
W
1 )/db× τ = −ΠU0 (εc0/b)(1− q(1− pˆiW ))τ −ΠW1 (εc1/b)τ. (16)
Finally, insert equations (13) to (16) into (12) to obtain (7) with ∆c0 = b + τ + d0 + Tp
D
0 − T0,
∆c1 = b+ τ , ∆
s
1 = b+ Tp
U
1 − d1 − TpD1 , and (11).
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